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INTRODUCTION
1

2

Increasingly, governmental bodies and scholars —including the
3
authors —have been promoting the integration of adaptive
management and collaborative planning into regulatory processes
to address deficiencies in conventional regulatory decision making.
Adaptive management advocates stress that resource management
should be more dynamic, changing over time to adjust to new
4
information and shifting ecological and social conditions.
Proponents of collaborative planning maintain that the best
management processes involve stakeholders working jointly to
1. See, e.g., Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570a (2000) (promoting
collaborative planning in the federal administrative rulemaking process); Notice of
Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and
Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,242, 35,252 (June 1, 2000) (adopting
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) guidance seeking to integrate adaptive management
and collaborative planning under the Endangered Species Act); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
STRATEGIC HABITAT CONSERVATION:
THE USFWS FRAMEWORK FOR LANDSCAPE
CONSERVATION
(2008),
available
at
http://www.fws.gov/science/doc/SHCFactSheet1008pdf.pdf (adopting “Strategic Habitat
Conservation” policy framework to promote the use of adaptive management in identified
priority areas or regions); Office of the Secretary of Interior, Protection and Enhancement
of Environmental Quality, 43 C.F.R. § 46.145 (2008) (incorporating adaptive management
into Department of the Interior rules implementing the National Environmental Policy Act);
Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282 (May 23, 1995) (setting up
collaborative planning process for negotiation of Final Project Agreements under the
Environmental Protection Agency’s Project XL).
2. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 21–33 (1997) (proposing a normative model of collaborative governance as a more
effective and legitimate process for resolving regulatory disputes); J.B. Ruhl, Taking Adaptive
Management Seriously: A Case Study of the Endangered Species Act, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1249, 1271–
84 (2004); J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. &
TECH. 21, 28 n.12 (2005).
3. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in
Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293 (2007) [hereinafter Camacho, Can Regulation
Evolve?]; Alejandro E. Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering
Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions, Installment Two, 24
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269 (2005) [hereinafter Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices]; Lawrence
Susskind et al., Integrating Scientific Information, Stakeholder Interests, and Political Concerns in
Resource and Environmental Planning and Management, in FOSTERING INTEGRATION: CONCEPTS
AND PRACTICE IN RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 181–203 (Kevin S. Hanna &
D. Scott Slocombe eds., 2007); Herman A. Karl et al., A Dialogue, Not A Diatribe: Effective
Integration of Science and Policy Through Joint Fact Finding, 49 ENV’T 20, 22–24 (2007).
4. Description
of
the
Collaborative
Adaptive
Management
Network,
http://www.adaptivemanagement.net (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).

Electronic
Electroniccopy
copyavailable
availableat:
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=1572720
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1572720

SUSSKIND MACRO 3.1.10

2010]

3/1/2010 7:45:58 PM

Adaptive Management in Glen Canyon

3

make decisions, rather than government agencies ordaining
5
resource management decisions independently.
Involving all
stakeholders from the beginning is likely to lead to more broadly
6
supported and thus more successful agreements.
When
combined, these two innovations are sometimes referred to as
7
collaborative adaptive management (“CAM”).
One of the most prominent attempts at CAM involves the
Department of the Interior’s (“DOI”) decision to rely on CAM, in
principle, to carry out its responsibilities under the Grand Canyon
8
Protection Act of 1992 to monitor the operation of the Glen
9
Canyon Dam, operate the Dam in compliance with a range of laws
10
and regulations, and mitigate any significant environmental
11
The Act stipulates that a variety of stakeholders—
impacts.
including several federal agencies, states, power generators,
recreational users, and environmental organizations—must be
12
consulted regarding dam operations. An Environmental Impact
Statement (“EIS”) released in 1995 recommended “adaptive
13
management” as the best approach to accomplish these tasks.
The 1995 EIS recommended using CAM because of the significant
uncertainties surrounding the socio-ecological systems involved, as
well as the importance of learning from practice and ongoing
14
research to improve operations over time.
Bruce Babbitt, the Secretary of the Interior at the time,
responded to the 1995 EIS by creating the Glen Canyon Dam

5. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 2, at 28–29; Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve?, supra note
3, at 307, 309–10.
6. See Thomas C. Beierle & Jerry Cayford, Dispute Resolution as a Method of Public
Participation, in THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION
53, 63–66 (Rosemary O’Leary & Lisa B. Bingham eds., 2003) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL
CONFLICT RESOLUTION] (discussing the instrumental value of public participation).
7. See Description of the Collaborative Adaptive Management Network, supra note 4.
8. Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, §§ 1801–1809, 106 Stat.
4600 (1992), available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/legal/gcpa1992.html.
9. Id. § 1805.
10. Id. § 1804.
11. Id. § 1802.
12. Id. § 1803(b).
13. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL ENVTL. IMPACT
STATEMENT FOR OPERATION OF GLEN CANYON DAM, COLO. RIVER STORAGE PROJECT, ARIZ. 34–
EIS],
available
at
38
(1995)
[hereinafter
FINAL
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/envdocs/eis/gc/gcdOpsFEIS.html.
14. Id. at 34.
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15

Adaptive Management Program (“AMP”).
At the heart of the
AMP is the Adaptive Management Working Group (“AMWG”),
which is a formal federal advisory committee whose charter was
16
signed in January 1997. In addition to the AMWG, the AMP now
includes the Technical Working Group (“TWG”), the Grand
Canyon Monitoring and Research Center (“GCMRC”), and
Independent Review Panels (“IRP”), and has an annual operating
17
budget of approximately eleven million dollars.
Many of its public and private participants, as well as observers of
the decade-old participatory experiment, have described the AMP
18
in glowing terms. Secretary of the Interior Dirk Kempthorne and
other key Interior officials identified the AMP as one of the most
19
successful examples of adaptive management in America.
Dr.
Carl Walters of the University of British Columbia’s Fisheries
Centre went so far as to suggest that Glen Canyon’s AMP, while not
perfect, is one of the few successful efforts to implement adaptive
20
management.
Dennis Kubly—the Bureau of Reclamation’s
program manager for the AMP—offers a more tempered analysis,
but ultimately points toward the research that has been conducted
21
to date as a sign of success.
22
We disagree, and the proof is in the results. After thirteen years

15. Glen
Canyon
Dam
Adaptive
Management
Program,
Background,
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/background.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
16. Id.
17. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION & U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GLEN CANYON DAM
ADAPTIVE MGMT. PROGRAM BIENNIAL BUDGET AND WORK PLAN, FISCAL YEARS 2010–11 (2009),
available
at
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/09aug12/FY1011_DraftWorkPlan.pdf.
18. See, e.g., Michael Gabaldon, Secretary’s Designee, Adaptive Management Work Group,
Address at the Colorado River Ecosystem Science Symposium (Oct. 25–27, 2005) (“[F]rom
the perspective of experimentation and reducing uncertainty, the Glen Canyon program is
one of the most successful in the world. We have undertaken and accomplished large-scale
experiments repeatedly . . . . We must not underestimate the difficulty of moving forward
with these tests within the context of a stakeholder process; the fact that they have occurred
at all is remarkable.”).
19. Secretary of the Interior Order No. 3270, Adaptive Management (2007) (“[Adaptive
management] has proved to be a useful approach in cases such as the Bureau of
Reclamation’s management of Glen Canyon Dam.”).
20. Gabaldon, supra note 18.
21. Dennis M. Kubly, Environmental Protection: Using Adaptive Management at Glen Canyon
Dam, HYDRO REV., Oct. 2009, available at http://www.hydroworld.com/index/display/articledisplay/9751553848/articles/hydro-review/volume-28/issue-7/articles/environmentalprotection.html.
22. See infra Part II.
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and millions of dollars, the AMP has failed to stabilize or otherwise
23
improve the quality of the fragile downstream ecosystem.
Furthermore, the AMP has been unable to make substantial
progress toward resolving the significant resource conflicts at the
24
heart of the Dam’s operations.
Kubly notes that for adaptive
management to succeed, “knowledge must make its way into policy
decisions that promote a balance between the historical primary
purposes of Glen Canyon Dam (i.e., water delivery and hydropower
production) and the more recently considered protection of
25
natural resources in the Colorado River ecosystem.”
This
fundamentally has not happened, and stakeholders have grown
26
restless.
What has gone wrong? The adoption of a collaborative adaptive
management approach is not the problem. In fact, CAM is a
technique well suited for managing the Glen Canyon Dam, and the
AMP incorporates a number of important innovations, including a
well-funded research program that has conducted experiments
providing valuable scientific information about the downstream

23. A 2006 USGS study suggested that humpback chub populations are stabilizing, and
that the low summer steady flow experiment from June through August 2000 may be one
reason. News Release, Grand Canyon Monitoring and Research Center, Endangered
Humpback Chub Population in Grand Canyon Stabilizing (Aug. 2006), available at
http://www.gcmrc.gov/research/humpback_chub/20060802.aspx. Environmental groups
counter that it is premature to say that this is a stabilization or recovery, claiming that twice
as many chub are needed to make that claim. April Reese, New Experimental Plan for Glen
Canyon Dam Operations Likely to Fall Short, Critics Say, LAND LETTER, Mar. 8, 2007, available at
http://www.eenews.net/Landletter/2007/03/08/2. More recent FWS research also disputes
that the test flows in 2000 can be given any credit, as recent modeling suggests that the
increased recruitment took place at least four years earlier. See STEVEN L. SPANGLE, U.S. FISH
& WILDLIFE SERV., FINAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR THE OPERATION OF GLEN CANYON DAM 20
(2008)
[hereinafter
FINAL
BIOLOGICAL
OPINION],
available
at
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/envdocs/bo/FinalGCDBO2-26-08.pdf; Letter from John Weisheit,
Conservation Dir., Living Rivers and Colorado Riverkeeper, & Michelle Harrington, Rivers
Program Dir., Center for Biological Diversity to the Hon. Dirk Kempthorne, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t
of the Interior, on Scoping Comments for the Environmental Impact Statement for the
Long-Term Experiment Plan for the Future Operations of Glen Canyon Dam (Feb. 28,
2007), available at http://www.livingrivers.org/pdfs/LRletterKempthorneFeb2007.pdf.
24. The fact that environmental groups have filed several lawsuits indicates a breakdown
in the AMP as a collaborative instrument for dispute resolution. See New Suit Filed over Glen
PRESS,
Dec.
9,
2007,
available
at
Canyon
Dam,
ASSOCIATED
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/1,5143,695234557,00.html; Shaun McKinnon, Lawsuit
Targets Arizona Dam; Says Native Fish Near Extinction, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb. 17, 2006, at 1A.
25. Kubly, supra note 21.
26. Id.
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27

ecosystem. The Glen Canyon Dam offers an ideal opportunity for
the systematic application of collaborative adaptive management,
especially since scientific uncertainty and disagreements have been
central to the ongoing acrimony among stakeholders.
If
implemented effectively, CAM can lead to more sustainable
management of natural resources and increase public support for
whatever tradeoffs have to be made among ecological, economic
development, and social welfare objectives. By bringing all parties
to the table, more information—including a clearer presentation of
the risks associated with managing the area’s resources—can be
obtained. When trust is fostered, parties are more open to
searching for ways of meeting the interests of others rather than
simply fighting for their personal interests. CAM can encourage
careful review of how previous management efforts have and have
not worked. 28
The problem is that the Glen Canyon Dam AMP has
implemented CAM ineffectively, largely due to Congress and the
DOI’s deficient initial design. Congress abdicated its responsibility
to provide clear guidance regarding the relative priority of
competing resource goals and the importance of various program
components. Equally importantly, the DOI failed to follow
commonly identified best practices in collaborative and adaptive
resource management in structuring the AMP. Without clear
direction or a commitment to resolving the ongoing resource
management conflicts, the AMP missed multiple opportunities
both to foster agency and stakeholder learning and to cultivate
constructive engagement of the stakeholders who care the most
about the Colorado River and the socio-ecological system it
27. See infra notes 135–37 and 217–18 and accompanying text.
28. See generally BYRON K. WILLIAMS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ADAPTIVE
MANAGEMENT: THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR TECHNICAL GUIDE 2 (2009)
[hereinafter
TECHNICAL
GUIDE],
available
at
http://www.doi.gov/initiatives/AdaptiveManagement/TechGuide.pdf;
ADAPTIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (C.S. Holling ed., 1978); KAI N. LEE,
COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLITICS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
(1993); PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS
(Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002); Kai N. Lee, Appraising Adaptive
Management, 3(2) CONSERVATION ECOLOGY 3 (1999) [hereinafter Lee, Appraising Adaptive
Mangement], available at http://www.consecol.org/vol3/iss2/art3; Per Olsson et al., Shooting
the Rapids: Navigating Transitions to Adaptive Governance of Social-Ecological Systems, 11(1)
&
SOC’Y
18
(2006),
available
at
ECOLOGY
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss1/art18.
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supports.
Though the Glen Canyon Dam AMP has fallen short of its
promise, its experience offers important lessons that can guide
future regulatory innovations. When Congress or federal agencies
encourage CAM, they can take steps to help harness the full
potential of this approach to collaborative governance. Through
its shortcomings, the Glen Canyon AMP demonstrates that
successful CAM requires careful institutional design at the outset
along with continuing systematic assessment and joint reflection
among stakeholders throughout the regulatory process.
In Part I of this article, we introduce the resource conflicts on the
Colorado River, outline the Glen Canyon Dam’s regulatory setting,
and explain how the Glen Canyon Dam AMP functions. In Part II,
we present persistent problems at Glen Canyon. In Part III, we
identify six best practices in collaborative adaptive management
that the AMP has failed to follow: (1) identifying appropriate
stakeholder representatives; (2) involving stakeholders in
developing a collaborative process; (3) using professional neutrals
and encouraging consensus building; (4) incorporating joint factfinding to deal with scientific uncertainty; (5) producing
collectively supported written agreements; and (6) committing to
build long-term management capabilities. We explain the benefits
of utilizing each best practice and analyze the extent to which,
based on available evidence, the Glen Canyon Dam AMP appears to
fall short in putting the practice to use. Finally, we conclude by
suggesting how legislatures and agencies can avoid the Glen
Canyon Dam AMP’s shortcomings when implementing future
collaborative adaptive management programs.
I. THE COLORADO RIVER’S ENDURING RESOURCE CONFLICT AND THE
GLEN CANYON DAM
The Colorado River is the lifeblood of much of the western
United States, providing water to seven American states and
Mexico. What was once a wild river, flowing from the Rocky
Mountains through parched deserts and the Grand Canyon into
the Gulf of California, is now heavily utilized and highly regulated.
29
The Law of the River —a collection of statutes, agreements,
29. The “Law of the River,” a collection of “numerous compacts, federal laws, court
decisions and decrees, contracts, and regulatory guidelines,” governs the use and

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1572720

SUSSKIND MACRO 3.1.10

8

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

3/1/2010 7:45:58 PM

[Vol. 35:1

regulations, and numerous court decisions—dictates how the river
will be managed, including how water will be allocated among the
various users and territories.
To improve management and storage of water from the river, the
Bureau of Reclamation constructed the Glen Canyon Dam above
Lee’s Ferry, Arizona and created Lake Powell between 1956 and
30
31
1963.
The total cost of the project was $314 million.
This
location was chosen because Lee’s Ferry marks an important
division between the upper and lower basins of the Colorado
River—the upper being the States of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah,
and Wyoming, and the lower being Arizona, California, and
Nevada. Each basin is entitled to 7.5 million acre-feet of water each
32
year under the Colorado River Compact of 1922. That leaves 1.5
management of the Colorado River among the seven basin states and Mexico. U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation, Law of the River, http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/lawofrvr.html (last
visited Jan. 22, 2010). See, e.g., Colorado River Compact, 70 CONG. REC. 324, 324–25 (1928),
available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/pdfiles/crcompct.pdf; Boulder Canyon
Project Act, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 617–617t
(2006)); Boulder Canyon Project, Agreement Requesting Apportionment of California’s
Share of the Colorado River Among the Applicants in the State (the “Seven Party
Agreement”),
Aug.
18,
1931,
available
at
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/pdfiles/ca7pty.pdf; Utilization of Waters of the
Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., Nov. 8, 1945, T.S. 994
[hereinafter
Water
Utilization
Treaty],
available
at
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/pdfiles/mextrety.pdf; Upper Colorado River Basin
Compact of 1948, art. IV, Apr. 16, 1949, 63 Stat. 31, available at
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/pdfiles/ucbsnact.pdf; Colorado River Storage
Project Act, ch. 203, 70 Stat. 105 (1956) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 620–620o
(2006)), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/pdfiles/crspuc.pdf; Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Colorado River Basin Project Act (Lower Colorado River
Basin Project Act), 82 Stat. 885 (1968) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1556
(2008)), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/pdfiles/crbproj.pdf; Criteria for
Coordinated Long-Range Operation of Colorado River Reservoirs Pursuant to the Colorado
River Basin Project Act of September 30, 1968 (P.L. 90-537), 35 Fed. Reg. 8951 (June 5,
1970), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/pdfiles/opcriter.pdf; INT’L
BOUNDARY & WATER COMMISSION, U.S. & MEX., MINUTE NO. 242, PERMANENT & DEFINITIVE
SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM OF THE SALINITY OF THE COLORADO RIVER
(1973), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/pdfiles/min242.pdf; Colorado
River Basin Salinity Control Act, 88 Stat. 266 (1974) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§§1571–1599).
30. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Glen Canyon Dam Construction History,
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/crsp/gc/history.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
31. This includes the cost of dam and power plant construction, as well as related
infrastructure, including the construction of the town of Page, Arizona. U.S. Geological
Survey,
Statistics
About
Glen
Canyon
Dam,
http://3dparks.wr.usgs.gov/glca/html/glen1860.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
32. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Lower Colorado Region, Law of the River,
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million acre-feet for Mexico, in accordance with the Mexican Water
33
Treaty of 1944. The Dam allows the upper basin to meet its treaty
obligations by releasing nine million acre-feet while holding back
34
its share.
The Bureau of Reclamation can store water in Lake
Powell—and Lake Mead downstream—and release it when
necessary to smooth out the Colorado’s significant year-over-year
35
variability in flow and ameliorate the impacts of droughts.
As
detailed in this Part, in light of the various stakeholders with
diverging interests in the Dam’s operation, as well as the wide
range of often conflicting laws that influence the management of
the Dam and the surrounding natural resources, Congress
established the Glen Canyon AMP as an innovative experiment in
resource management.

http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/lawofrvr.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
33. Water Utilization Treaty, supra note 29, art. 10, ¶ (a).
34. GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM: AMWG FACA COMMITTEE GUIDANCE
(2000),
available
at
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/00jan20/Attach_07b.pdf.
35. Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, Water Storage and Delivery,
http://www.gcdamp.gov/keyresc/waterSD.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
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SOURCE: Map of Glen Canyon Dam,
http://walrus.wr.usgs.gov/grandcan/images/map.gif (last visited Jan. 24,
2010).

A. The Stakeholders
In addition to operating the Dam to ensure that obligations
under the Law of the River are met, other competing
considerations influence how the Dam is operated. First, while the
primary purpose of constructing the Glen Canyon Dam was to
regulate the flow of the river, a secondary objective has always been
36
to generate hydroelectric power.
Revenue from power sales is
37
paying off the Dam’s construction debt, albeit slowly. Operating
the Dam optimally for hydroelectric power generation requires
fluctuating water releases throughout the course of each day,
38
depending on demand. Second, some advocate for operating the
Dam in a manner that alleviates environmental impacts. Over
time, concerns arose regarding the Dam’s impacts on the
environment and endangered species such as the humpback chub.
Traditionally, the Colorado swelled in the spring with sedimentladen snowmelt, then receded in the summer, depositing the
39
sediment and replenishing sandbars in the process.
Species
indigenous to the area, including the humpback chub, adapted to
40
these conditions over time.
The operations regime favored by
hydroelectric interests and used in practice disrupts these natural
conditions: water is impounded, making it cooler and allowing the
sediment to settle, then released through turbines in fluctuations
41
defined by electricity needs.
Conservationists have, therefore,
36. 43 U.S.C. § 620 (2006).
37. Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.gcdamp.gov/faq.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010); Glen Canyon Institute,
Frequently
Asked
Questions
About
Restoring
Glen
Canyon,
http://www.glencanyon.org/aboutgci/faq.php (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
38. Glen
Canyon
Dam
Adaptive
Management
Program,
Hydropower,
http://www.gcdamp.gov/keyresc/hydropower.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010) [hereinafter
Hydropower].
39. MARK T. ANDERSON ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CONTROLLED FLOODING OF THE
COLORADO RIVER IN GRAND CANYON: THE RATIONALE AND DATA-COLLECTION PLANNED
(1996), available at http://water.usgs.gov/wid/FS_089-96/FS_089-96.pdf.
40. GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. PROGRAM, HISTORICAL NATIVE FISHES OF GLEN
AND GRAND CANYONS 1 (2006), available at http://www.gcdamp.gov/fs/histNF.pdf.
41. Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, Sediment and River Sand Bars in
the Grand Canyon, http://www.gcdamp.gov/keyresc/sediment.html (last visited Jan. 22,
2010); Hydropower, supra note 38.
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called for changes in water releases aimed at ameliorating these
impacts, including slower ramping rates and high-flow releases in
42
spring. Finally, groups with other interests—such as sport fishing,
whitewater rafting, other recreational interests, and protecting
cultural sites—influence how the Dam should be operated.
The Bureau of Reclamation and the states are interested
43
primarily in the water storage services the Dam provides. Their
overriding objectives are to meet the demand for water in the arid
44
southwest and fulfill their obligations under the Law of the River.
Lake Powell, the reservoir behind Glen Canyon Dam, stores more
than 26.2 million acre-feet of water and provides consistent flows to
45
downstream withdrawers even in times of drought. Lowering the
reservoir or removing the Dam altogether for environmental
reasons could negatively impact storage and usage capabilities,
46
particularly for the upper basin states. The water stored in Lake
Powell created by Glen Canyon Dam “serves as a ‘bank account’

42. April Reese, Colorado River Adaptive Management Program Needs Overhaul, Critics Say,
LETTER,
May
7,
2009,
available
at
LAND
http://www.eenews.net/public/Landletter/2009/05/07/1.
43. See generally GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
INTERIOR, MEETING MINUTES 1997–PRESENT [hereinafter MEETING MINUTES], available at
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/mtgmin.html (select desired meeting date from either
“Select 2006–2010 Meeting Date” or “Archive: 1997–2005” drop-down menus; then follow
“Draft Meeting Minutes” hyperlink). For example, at the August 9–11, 2004 AMWG
meeting, Tom Ryan, a Bureau of Reclamation employee, reported that “the big concern in
the basin continues to be the drought,” but that they were working with basin states to
analyze options and develop contingency plans. See GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT.
WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, MINUTES OF AUG. 9–11, 2004 MEETING 15 (2004)
[hereinafter
FINAL
MEETING
MINUTES
AUGUST
2004],
available
at
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/04aug09/Final_Mins.pdf.
At the same
meeting, representatives of Colorado and Nevada voiced opposition to the implementation
of experimental floods in Water Year 2005 because of the drought conditions. See id. at 17.
44. See, e.g., FINAL MEETING MINUTES AUGUST 2004, supra note 43, at 17.
45. See U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Upper Colorado Region: Colorado River Storage
Project, http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/crsp/gc/index.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010);
COMMITTEE ON THE SCIENTIFIC BASES OF COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER MGMT. ET AL.,
COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT:
EVALUATING AND ADJUSTING TO
HYDROCLIMATIC VARIABILITY 36 (2007) [hereinafter COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER MGMT.
ET AL.], available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11857 (“With a reservoir
comparable in size to Lake Mead, storage provided by Lake Powell helps ensure that the
upper basin states meet their water delivery obligations to the lower basin.”).
46. Ronald K. Christensen, The Proposed Draining of Lake Powell: An Inequitable
Taking of Upper Colorado River Basin States Rights 39–42 (2000), available at
http://www.riversimulator.org/Resources/Controversy/DrainingPowellInequitableChristens
en2000.pdf.
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47

that can be drawn on in times of drought.” This stored water has
made it possible to meet the needs of cities, industries, and
48
agriculture throughout the West during dry periods.
The Bureau of Reclamation, the states, the Western Area Power
Administration, and the contractors that purchase power are also
49
concerned about maximizing power generation. The Dam is an
important source of power for the region, producing
approximately 4.5 billion kilowatt-hours annually, which offsets
50
about 2.5 million tons of coal or eleven million barrels of oil. The
“controlled floods” advocated by some conservation and recreation
51
interests lower the Dam’s power generating potential.
Any
changes to the permitted ramping rate (i.e., the speed at which
releases change) or seasonal and/or daily restrictions also undercut
52
power generation.
Environmental organizations, including the Sierra Club, opposed
47. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, supra note 45.
48. Id.
49. See Hydropower, supra note 38; FINAL MEETING MINUTES AUGUST 2004, supra note 43.
For example, at the August 9–11, 2004 meeting, the issue of maintaining a healthy basin
fund—the pool of funds generated by hydroelectric generation used to pay for the AMP—
was raised in defense of forgoing experimental high flow releases. Id.
50. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Storage Project, Frequently Asked
Questions About Glen Canyon Dam, http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/crsp/gc/faq.html (last
visited Jan. 22, 2010).
51. Controlled flows undercut power generation. Flows can be managed to maximize
profit by responding to shifting changes in electricity prices, but the flows required to
achieve these goals are not necessarily the flows that ensure maximum environmental
protection. Furthermore, during controlled high flows, water is released via bypass tubes,
representing lost generation capacity. Hydropower, supra note 38. According to Western
Area Power Administration projections, the total cost of purchasing power elsewhere to
compensate for reduced generation during the 2008 high flow test year was estimated to be
$4.1 million. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR EXPERIMENTAL RELEASES FROM GLEN CANYON DAM, ARIZ.,
2008 THROUGH 2012 6 (2008) [hereinafter FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT], available at
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/envdocs/ea/gc/2008hfe/GCD-finalEA2-29-08.pdf.
This
represented a 9.4% increase in the amount required to purchase power. Id. at 37.
52. Hydropower supra note 38; GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S.
DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL MINUTES OF APRIL 29–30, 2009 MEETING 14 (2009)
[hereinafter
FINAL
MEETING
MINUTES
APRIL
2009],
available
at
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/09apr29/Final_Minutes.pdf
(“If
you
equalize the months, it causes us to be short of power to meet our contracts during those
peak months and it will cause us to be long on power in the off-peak months. [We] would
have to buy from the market in order to meet the contracts and peak months our prices tend
to be higher and in the off-peak months we will be long on power. We will be selling the
excess off in times when prices are down because they are off-peak months. So this would
have a definite financial impact to power.”).
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the initial plan for what was to become the Colorado River Storage
Project Act of 1956, which called for a series of dams along the
53
Colorado River, including two in Dinosaur National Monument.
The Sierra Club’s primary concern at the time was that “no major
54
scenic resource should be sacrificed for a power project.” The
Sierra Club eventually dropped its opposition to the Colorado
River Storage Project Act, including the Glen Canyon Dam, in
exchange for project modifications that canceled the two upstream
dams at Echo Park and Split Mountain in Dinosaur National
55
Monument.
Many environmentalists came to regret this
56
acquiescence. Indeed, in light of concerns about the impact of
the Dam on the environment and endangered species,
environmental groups have challenged the Dam’s existence and
57
management ever since.
There are eight endangered and three threatened species in the
area: four of the endangered species—the southwestern willow
flycatcher, humpback chub, razorback sucker, and Kanab
58
ambersnail—have been adversely affected by dam operations.
53. 43 U.S.C. §§ 620–620o (2006); David R. Brower, Let the River Run Through It, 82 SIERRA
MAG. 42 (1997), available at http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/199703/brower.asp.
54. Brower, supra note 53.
55. Echo Park and Split Mountain would have inundated Dinosaur National Monument,
a protected area and natural treasure already being visited by thousands annually in the
1950s. Glen Canyon was less appreciated because it was not well known. See, e.g., Mark W.T.
Harvey, Echo Park, Glen Canyon, and the Postwar Wilderness Movement, 60 PAC. HIST. REV. 43, 44
(Feb. 1991) (“There had been relatively little concern about the beauties of Glen Canyon
during the debate over the [Colorado River Storage Project], in part because only a handful
of people had seen the canyon.”); MARK W.T. HARVEY, A SYMBOL OF WILDERNESS: ECHO PARK
AND THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION MOVEMENT 222 (1994) (“A generation of
environmentalists became so enchanted with Glen Canyon and the surrounding landscape
of the Colorado Plateau [in the aftermath of the Echo Park controversy] that much has been
forgotten about its obscurity in the early 1950s. At the time of the controversy over Echo
Park, Glen Canyon remained largely unknown but for a handful of river runners in Utah.”).
56. For example, Sierra Club executive director and Friends of the Earth founder David
Brower later stated, “Glen Canyon died in 1963 and I was partly responsible for its needless
death . . . . Neither you nor I, nor anyone else, knew it well enough to insist that at all costs it
should endure. When we began to find out it was too late.” David R. Brower, Foreword to
ELIOT PORTER, THE PLACE NO ONE KNEW: GLEN CANYON ON THE COLORADO 8 (David R.
Brower ed., commemorative ed., Peregrine Smith Books 1988) (1963).
57. National Wildlife Fed’n v. W. Area Power Admin., No. 88-C-11750 (C.D. Utah Sept.
29,
1989)
(order
granting
injunction),
available
at
http://www.riversimulator.org/Resources/Legal/GCD/NWFinjuntion1989.pdf, which led to
the creation of the AMP in the first place, is one of the lawsuits filed by environmental
organizations challenging the operation of the Glen Canyon Dam.
58. Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, Endangered Species,
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The humpback chub and razorback sucker are of particular
59
interest because they are found only in the Colorado River Basin.
60
Despite a recent stabilization in the estimated chub population,
their current numbers are much lower than they were before the
61
river was heavily modified.
According to conservationists, a
number of changes caused by building the Dam present challenges
to these endangered species, including decreased sediment load,
cooler and more constant temperatures, more constant flows
rather than natural seasonal variation, beach and bar erosion, and
62
the arrival of invasive species.
Environmentalists also argue that the water storage services the
dam provides are not particularly valuable, given that sufficient
storage capacity exists elsewhere in the system and that a staggering
63
volume is lost to evaporation from Lake Powell annually.
Recognizing that outright removal of the Dam is unlikely,
environmental organizations and other conservation interests,
including the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, advocate flow
modifications, like controlled flood releases and restricted ramping
64
rates. Such modified flow regimes would be designed to restore
and maintain the habitat and other conditions essential for species
65
like the humpback chub. Modified flow regimes, however, often
66
conflict with water supply and power interests.
The area around Glen Canyon remains only sparsely populated;
http://www.gcdamp.gov/keyresc/es.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010) [hereinafter
Endangered Species].
59. Id.
60. MATTHEW E. ANDERSEN, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, FACT SHEET 2009-3035: STATUS
AND TRENDS OF THE GRAND CANYON POPULATION OF HUMPBACK CHUB 2 (2009), available at
http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2009/3035/fs2009-3035.pdf.
61. Id.;
Upper
Colorado
River
Endangered
Fish
Recovery
Program,
http://www.fws.gov/coloradoriverrecovery/Index.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
62. Endangered Species, supra note 58.
63. Scott K. Miller, Undamming Glen Canyon: Lunacy, Rationality, or Prophecy?, 19 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 121, 174–75 (2000).
64. For example, during the August 2007 AMWG meeting, an environmental group
representative with the support of the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Park
Service recommended that the Secretary implement seasonally-adjusted steady flows in 2008.
However, few other members agreed. GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP,
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, MINUTES OF AUG. 29–30, 2007 MEETING 10–11 (2007)
[hereinafter
FINAL
MEETING
MINUTES
AUGUST
2007],
available
at
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/07aug29/Final_Mins.pdf.
65. See Recovery of Upper Colorado River Basin Fish: Protecting Stream Flows, Part 1,
http://www.fws.gov/coloradoriverrecovery/Crrpflo1.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
66. Hydropower, supra note 38; FINAL MEETING MINUTES APRIL 2009, supra note 52.
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with no roads and a harsh landscape, the area contained even fewer
67
residents when the Dam was proposed.
It is the traditional
territory of the Havasupi, Hopi, Hualapi, Navajo, Pueblo, and
Southern Paiute tribes, who attach great religious and cultural
68
significance to sites within the canyons and along the river.
It
appears, however, that there was little opposition from the tribes at
the time of construction, perhaps because the Dam brought
tangible economic benefits in the form of employment
opportunities, and the Navajo Nation was compensated for the
69
land it lost.
Overall, the impacts of the Dam on tribes have been mixed. The
Dam and associated tourism are a major source of income for the
70
Navajo Nation and other tribes; however, the flooding of the
71
canyon, the erosion resulting from the modified downstream
72
73
flow, and tourism have harmed important sacred and historical
74
sites. Beyond specific places of historical and cultural significance
that have been impacted, various zones, vistas, and the general
67. Shaun McKinnon, At Age 50, Dam Still Generates Love, Hate, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 28,
2007, available at http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/0528damanniversary0528.html.
68. GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
CULTURAL RESOURCES FACT SHEET 2 (2006) [hereinafter CULTURAL RESOURCES FACT
SHEET], available at http://www.gcdamp.gov/fs/cultResc.pdf.
69. See
H.R.
REP.
No.
2789
(1956),
available
at
http://water.library.arizona.edu/body.1_div.18.html.
70. See Senate Concurrent Memorial 1002, 43d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2001)
(“Whereas, the Navajo Nation is concerned that the breaching of Glen Canyon Dam and the
draining of Lake Powell would wreak disaster on the economic and social welfare of the
Navajo Nation and would detrimentally and fundamentally alter the water preservation,
delivery and supply system crafted by many decades of planning . . . .”), available at
http://www.azleg.state.az.us/legtext/45leg/1r/bills/scm1002p.pdf.
71. See Richard Ingebretsen, History of Glen Canyon and the Glen Canyon Institute,
http://www.glencanyon.org/library/articles/presaccount.php (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
72. Jeffrey W. Jacobs & James L. Wescoat, Jr., Managing River Resources: Lessons from Glen
Canyon Dam, 44(2) ENV’T 8, 11 (2002).
73. See
Amy
Corbin,
Sacred
Land
Film
Project:
Rainbow
Bridge,
http://www.sacredland.org/index.php/rainbow-bridge/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2010)
(explaining the damaging effects of tourism on Lake Powell); Group’s Challenge to Sacred Site
Policy Rejected, INDIANZ.COM, Mar. 31, 2004, http://indianz.com/News/archive/000949.asp
(“Several tribes, including the Navajo Nation and the Hopi Tribe, consider Rainbow Bridge
to be an important religious site that people should not approach for fear of upsetting the
balance of life.”).
74. COMMITTEE ON GRAND CANYON MONITORING AND RESEARCH & NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, DOWNSTREAM: ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF GLEN CANYON DAM AND THE COLORADO
RIVER
ECOSYSTEM
23
(1999)
[hereinafter
DOWNSTREAM],
available
at
http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=9590.
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attributes of the region are considered culturally important, and
even sacred, by both Native American groups and non-native
groups in the area, and these vistas and attributes have been altered
75
as a result of the Dam’s construction.
Over the years, other groups, such as anglers and rafters, have
taken interest in the River, the Dam, and water resource
management. A vibrant sport fishery has grown out of the trout
76
that thrive in the cool, clear waters released from the Dam.
Anglers from around the world come to the Lee’s Ferry area to fish
77
for rainbow trout in the fast-flowing river. While initially stocked,
78
this fishery is now self-sustaining.
It is, however, managed as a
79
“blue ribbon” fishing experience. Anglers benefit from the Dam’s
operations because the conditions are conducive to the trout
80
fishery.
Rafting brings an estimated $83 million into the local
81
economy annually, generating approximately 600 jobs.
While
rafters generally benefit from the constant flow the Dam releases
year-round, this flow and the Dam’s trapping of sediment are
eroding the beaches that serve as important launch and rest points
82
for the rafting industry. Boating and recreation in and around
Lake Powell are also important tourism draws; the Glen Canyon
National Recreation Area receives approximately two million
83
visitors annually.
The animosity among these stakeholders has increased over time,
as their positions regarding releases have hardened and each has
felt increasingly threatened by the demands of others. Though
perhaps popular when approved, large dams like the Glen Canyon
Dam have become controversial and politically unattractive.

75. CULTURAL RESOURCES FACT SHEET, supra note 68, at 2.
76. Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, Lees [sic] Ferry Trout Fishery,
http://www.gcdamp.gov/keyresc/tf.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. A “blue ribbon” fishery is managed to provide a high quality experience for anglers,
including larger fish and a high catch rate; such fisheries promote tourism. Id.
80. Id.
81. Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, Whitewater Recreation—
Colorado River in Grand Canyon, http://www.gcdamp.gov/keyresc/wr.html (last visited Jan.
22, 2010).
82. Id.
83. Press Release, Glen Canyon National Recreation Area, 2007 Budget and Annual
Performance Plan for Glen Canyon and Rainbow Bridge Available for Public Review (June
20, 2007), available at http://www.nps.gov/glca/parknews/upload/07-16%20budget.pdf.
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Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona, once a strong supporter of the
Glen Canyon Dam, later reflected: “I have to be honest with you.
I’d be happier if we didn’t have the lake. I’d vote against it. I’ve
become convinced that, while water is important, particularly for
84
those of us who live in the desert, it’s not that important.”
Additionally, serious conflicts have arisen regarding management
of the Colorado River more generally as population growth,
economic development, and climate change have exacerbated
water scarcity, increased electricity demand, and compounded
85
environmental impacts. Climate change threatens to magnify the
86
problem in the longer term if it reduces stream flow as predicted.
The following table summarizes the primary interests of the
stakeholder groups involved in the AMP as reflected in their legal
87
mandates and stated interests. Each stakeholder group or agency
gets one vote unless otherwise noted (i.e., each of the seven states
84. McKinnon, supra note 67.
85. COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER MGMT. ET AL., supra note 45, at 17 (“The legal and
physical infrastructure for managing Colorado River water resources was designed to help
address or ameliorate conflicts [among different water users], in part by creating systems to
store water during wet periods so that demands during drought can be reliably met.”).
86. Id. at 19 (“Global climate models that project warmer future temperatures—and, in
turn, increased rates of evapotranspiration—have important implications for runoff, water
storage, and water planning decisions.”).
87. See
generally
U.S.
Bureau
of
Reclamation,
About
Us,
http://www.usbr.gov/main/about/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2010); U.S. Dep’t of the Interior,
Indian Affairs, What We Do, http://www.bia.gov/WhatWeDo/index.htm (last visited Jan. 22,
2010); U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, FWS at a Glance, http://www.fws.gov/fwsataglance.html
(last
visited
Jan.
22,
2010);
National
Park
Service,
About
Us,
http://www.nps.gov/aboutus/index.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2010); U.S. Dep’t of the
Interior,
Western
Area
Power
Administration,
About
Western,
http://www.wapa.gov/about/default.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2010); Arizona Game & Fish
Dep’t, Inside AZGFD, http://www.azgfd.gov/inside_azgfd/inside_azgfd.shtml (last visited
Jan. 22, 2010); Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Hopi Tribe, Introductory Information,
http://www.itcaonline.com/tribes_hopi.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010); Inter Tribal Council
of
Arizona,
Haulapai
Tribe,
Introductory
Information,
http://www.itcaonline.com/tribes_hualapai.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010); Official Site of
the Navajo Nation, Introduction, http://www.navajo.org/history.htm (last visited Jan. 22,
2010); Inside the Wildlands Council, Our Mission, Goals, & Strategy,
http://www.grandcanyonwildlands.org/insideMission.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010); Grand
Canyon Trust, About Us, http://www.grandcanyontrust.org/about.php (last visited Jan. 22,
2010); Grand Canyon River Guides, About Us, http://www.gcrg.org/aboutus.php (last
visited Jan. 22, 2010); Federation of Fly Fishers, Our History & Mission,
http://www.fedflyfishers.org/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2010); Colorado River Energy Distributors
Association, About Us, http://www.creda.org/Pages/Who.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010);
Utah
Associated
Municipal
Power
Systems,
About
UAMPS,
http://www.uamps.com/index.php/about-uamps (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
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gets a vote, as do each of the environmental groups). These
general views may vary from issue to issue, and certain stakeholder
groups may split internally on a specific issue (e.g., though the
states often agree, their interests on a particular matter may
conflict in important respects).

Stakeholder group/agency
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
U.S. National Park Service
Western Area Power Administration
Arizona Game and Fish
Department
Tribes (X 6)

States (X 7)
Environmental groups (X 2)
Recreation groups (X 2)
Power purchasers (X 2)

Mandate
Hydroelectric power generation
and water extraction
Provide services to and manage
land in trust for American Indian
tribes
Natural resource management
Natural resource management
Hydroelectric power generation
Natural resource management
Protect the interests and enhance
the wellbeing of tribe members,
including fostering economic
opportunities, protecting cultural
tradition, and maintaining a
healthy environment
Water extraction and hydroelectric
power generation
Nature conservation
Recreation
Hydroelectric power generation

B. The Regulatory Setting
The Bureau of Reclamation operates the Glen Canyon Dam in
accordance with the Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956.
This law authorized construction of the Glen Canyon Dam—along
with other dams, reservoirs, power plants, and transmission
infrastructure in the upper Colorado basin—and enumerates the
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Dam’s water management and power generation goals. The
Bureau of Reclamation, a division of the DOI, was created in 1902
to promote settlement and economic development in the West by
facilitating the capture and delivery of water to meet the needs of
89
farmers and communities.
Today, it is the largest water
wholesaler in the country, and the second largest producer of
90
hydroelectric power in the Western states. The Bureau’s mission
has evolved to recognize the various benefits and costs associated
with its work of regulating rivers. Today, its declared goal is “to
manage, develop, and protect water and related resources in an
environmentally and economically sound manner in the interest of
91
the American public.”
Fulfilling this mission involves making
difficult choices regarding how dams like Glen Canyon Dam should
be operated to balance a variety of interests and comply with
numerous regulations.
The regulations governing the Dam’s management have changed
over time, reflecting both shifting interests among stakeholders
and increased scientific understanding. Perhaps as a result, the
multiple, and often conflicting, laws and directives governing the
operation of the Dam establish no clear prioritization among the
92
various competing usage demands.
The only cultural or
environmental stipulation in the Colorado River Storage Project
Act of 1956 is that the Secretary of the Interior must “take adequate
protective measures to preclude impairment of the Rainbow Bridge
93
National Monument.”
Various environmental and cultural
preservation acts passed in subsequent years—particularly the
National Historic Preservation Act (1966), the National
88. 43 U.S.C. § 620 (2006).
89. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, About Us, http://www.usbr.gov/main/about (last visited
Jan. 22, 2010).
90. Id.
91. U.S.
Bureau
of
Reclamation,
Mission
Statement,
http://www.usbr.gov/main/about/mission.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
92. Alejandro E. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture: Learning About Ecosystem Management from the
Glen Canyon Dam Experiment, 8 NEV. L.J. 942, 947–49 (2008) [hereinafter Camacho, Beyond
Conjecture] (explaining how the circular and confusing requirements of the Grand Canyon
Protection Act of 1992 have led to conflicting and ineffective regulations governing the
operation of the dam).
93. 43 U.S.C. § 620 (2006). In 1974, Navajo tribe members filed a lawsuit alleging that
Lake Powell’s rising waters were impacting the site of Rainbow Bridge, but the court ruled
against the tribe, stating that water storage needs outweighed their concerns. National Park
Service,
History
&
Culture
of
Rainbow
Bridge
National
Monument,
http://www.nps.gov/rabr/historyculture (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
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Environmental Policy Act (1969), and the Endangered Species Act
(1973)—have had major implications for the Dam’s operation. For
example, the Endangered Species Act explicitly protects the
94
humpback chub, which the Dam has impacted adversely.
This
statutory protection has been the foundation of numerous lawsuits
95
and biological opinions filed over the past few decades.
In 1992, Congress enacted the Grand Canyon Protection Act
(“GCPA”) in an effort to consolidate the body of regulations
96
governing the Dam’s operations. Rather than clarifying priorities
and sorting out conflicting regulations, the GCPA confused
matters. While allowing for a decrease in power generation, the
GCPA reinforced the water management and hydroelectric
97
priorities the Dam was initially meant to serve. At the same time,
it stated that the dam and water resources should be managed in
“such a manner as to protect, mitigate adverse impacts to, and
improve the values for which Grand Canyon National Park and
Glen Canyon National Recreation Area were established, including
98
natural and cultural resources and visitor use.” Thus, the GCPA
does not set priorities among cultural, environmental, and
recreational interests; nor does it mandate how they should be
reconciled with water management objectives when the interests
conflict. In fact, the GCPA seems to suggest that all demands can
be met, and that the GCPA should in no way affect water
allocations or conflict with any federal environmental laws.
The GCPA did call upon the Secretary of the Interior to prepare
an EIS evaluating the Dam’s operations; given the uncertainties,
the GCPA asked the Secretary to take responsibility for long-term
monitoring of the Dam’s impact so that operations could be
adjusted over time to account for new information or changed

94. Robert W. Adler, Restoring the Environment and Restoring Democracy: Lessons from the
Colorado River, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 76 (2007).
95. See, e.g., id. at 84–85.
96. Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 1805, 106 Stat. 4600
(1992), available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/legal/gcpa1992.html.
97. Id. (“The Secretary shall implement this section in a manner fully consistent with and
subject to the Colorado River Compact, the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, the Water
Treaty of 1944 with Mexico, the decree of the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California, and
the provisions of the Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956 and the Colorado River
Basin Project Act of 1968 that govern allocation, appropriation, development, and
exportation of the waters of the Colorado River basin.”).
98. Id.
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99

circumstances.
Presumably, long-term monitoring would
determine the impacts that management has on “the natural,
recreational, and cultural resources of Grand Canyon National
100
Park and Glen Canyon National Recreation Area.” Furthermore,
the GCPA requires that such monitoring be conducted in
consultation with various stakeholders, ranging from the governors
of the affected states to the recreation industry.
In 1996, Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt signed the Record of
101
Decision (“ROD”) for the EIS. More than forty assessments,
undertaken by fifteen different agencies, were incorporated into
102
it.
Among other things, the ROD mandated the creation of an
Adaptive Management Working Group (“AMWG”), with various
stakeholder representatives empowered to make recommendations
regarding the Dam’s management to the Secretary of the Interior
in light of changing data and within the boundaries set by the
103
relevant rules, regulations, and decisions.
C. The Adaptive Management Program
The 1996 Record of Decision mandated the creation of the
AMWG, but did not specify requirements beyond stating that it
should be chartered in accordance with the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (“FACA”) to conduct experiments and undertake
monitoring that might lead to operational changes, provided they
104
comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).
In January 1997, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt signed a
Charter for the AMWG, which prescribes the following duties for
the group: establish operating procedures; advise the Secretary of
the Interior in meeting the environmental and cultural
commitments in the EIS Record of Decision; recommend a
framework for AMP policy, goals, and direction; recommend
resource management objectives for the long-term monitoring plan
and any other research required to assess the impact of the Dam’s
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM ORIGINS 1 (2005) [hereinafter AMP ORIGINS], available at
http://www.gcdamp.gov/fs/amp_orig.pdf.
102. Id.; see generally FINAL EIS, supra note 13.
103. Id.
104. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, RECORD OF DECISION: OPERATION OF GLEN CANYON
DAM (1996), available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/pdfs/sp_appndxG_ROD.pdf.
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operations; contribute to and review the mandated yearly report to
Congress and relevant state governors; review long-term
monitoring data to assess whether or not goals are being met and
make operations and resource management recommendations
accordingly; and monitor and report on all program activities
105
undertaken to confirm that they are in compliance.
The Charter also stipulates that the AMWG will report to the
Secretary of the Interior via his or her designee, who will act as the
chairperson; that the group is expected to meet biannually; and
that membership, which is appointed by the Secretary, should
106
include, but not be limited to:
•
•

•
•

The Secretary’s Designee;
A representative from each of the twelve government authorities
associated with the EIS:
o U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,
o U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs,
o U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
o U.S. National Park Service,
o Western Area Power Administration,
o Arizona Game and Fish Department,
o Hopi Tribe,
o Hualapai Tribe,
o Navajo Nation,
o San Juan Southern Paiute Tribe,
o Southern Paiute Consortium, and
o Pueblo of Zuni;
A representative from each of the seven Colorado River Basin
States; and
Two representatives each from environmental groups, recreation
groups, and contractors that purchase power generated by the
Dam.

The AMWG first met in September of 1997, and spent the next
few months establishing itself and proposing operating procedures
107
that outline how the group functions.
Most significantly, these
105. GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT WORK GROUP CHARTER (1997) [hereinafter
GROUP
CHARTER],
available
at
WORK
www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/97sep10/Attach_01.pdf.
106. Id.
107. See GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
MINUTES OF SEPT. 10–11, 1997 MEETING (1997) [hereinafter MEETING MINUTES SEPTEMBER
1997],
available
at
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/97sep10/Meeting_Minutes.pdf;
GLEN
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procedures mandate: Robert’s Rules of Order as the default
operating manual; the approval of motions through consensus,
with recourse to passing motions by a two-thirds majority when the
chair deems consensus impossible; and the confirmation of the
108
standing Technical Work Group (“TWG”) as a sub-committee.
The TWG, which is comprised of technical representatives from
each of the groups on the AMWG, is to perform tasks assigned to it
by the main group. Tasks include developing “criteria and
standards for monitoring and research programs,” providing
“periodic reviews and updates,” “developing resource management
questions for the design of monitoring and research” by the
GCMRC, and providing information for “preparing annual
109
resource reports and other reports” for the AMWG.
The GCMRC was created “to provide credible, objective scientific
information to the Glen Canyon Dam AMP on the effects of
operating Glen Canyon Dam under the Record of Decision and
other management actions on the downstream resources of the
Colorado River ecosystem, utilizing an ecosystem science
110
approach.”
The GCMRC is part of the U.S. Geological Survey,
but responds to research questions posed by the AMWG, typically
111
through the TWG.
Independent Review Panels, including the
Science Advisory Board, independently assess program proposals

CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, MINUTES OF JAN.
15–16,
1998
MEETING
(1998),
available
at
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/98jan15/Final_Minutes.pdf.
108. GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
FINAL OPERATING PROCEDURES 1, 2, 4 (1998) [hereinafter FINAL OPERATING PROCEDURES],
available
at
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/98jul21/Attach_11.pdf.
Robert’s Rules of Order “were designed to ‘assist an assembly to accomplish in the best
possible manner the work for which it was designed.’” LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND & JEFFREY L.
CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT’S RULES 8 (2006). “Most versions of the Rules begin with an
‘Order of Precedence of Motions,’ which defines which kind of motion is more important
than another, and a ‘Table of Rules Relating to Motions,’ which claims to answer three
hundred questions about parliamentary practice.” Id. See, e.g., HENRY M. ROBERT, ROBERT’S
RULES OF ORDER (BiblioBazaar 2008).
109. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program
Technical Work Group, http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/twg/twg_index.html (last visited
Jan. 22, 2010).
110. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, THE ROLE OF THE U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GRAND
CANYON MONITORING AND RESEARCH CENTER IN THE GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE
MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM
1,
available
at
http://www.gcmrc.gov/files/pdf/gcmrc_roles_amp.pdf.
111. Id.
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and outcomes to ensure scientific objectivity and credibility.

112

SOURCE: Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, AMWG
Membership, http://www.gcdamp.gov/aboutamp/member.html (last
visited Jan. 22, 2010).

II. THE PERSISTENCE OF PROBLEMS AT GLEN CANYON
Since its creation a decade ago, the AMP has received praise from
various agency officials and scholars who maintain that the Glen
Canyon Dam AMP is a successful model of collaborative, adaptive
113
regulation and management.
Despite these accolades and
considerable funding, a growing number of observers have
concluded that the Glen Canyon Dam AMP has been far from
114
successful.
The Glen Canyon Dam AMP should not be considered a success
112. Id. at 1–2.
113. See, e.g., TECHNICAL GUIDE, supra note 28, at 1; Vicky J. Meretsky et al., Balancing
Endangered Species and Ecosystems: A Case Study of Adaptive Management in Grand Canyon, 25
MGMT.
579
(2000),
available
at
ENVTL.
http://www.springerlink.com/content/axdga0cfuqfwhh4u/fulltext.pdf; Holly Doremus,
Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges of “New Age”
Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 78–79 (2001). See also supra notes 18–21 and
accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 94; Joseph M. Feller, Collaborative Management of Glen
Canyon Dam: The Elevation of Social Engineering Over Law, 8 NEV. L.J. 896 (2008); Camacho,
Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92.
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because it has failed to address effectively the concerns that led to
its creation in the first place, including: (1) developing a
stakeholder-supported operating plan responsive to increased
understanding; (2) averting litigation and other attempts to resolve
conflict outside of the AMP context; and (3) protecting the
115
downstream ecology, including endangered species. This Part of
the article outlines the AMP’s failure to achieve these objectives
and explains how these failures translate into the persistent
problems at the Dam.
A. There Has Been Little Progress on Formulating a Long-Term
Plan to Operate the Dam
Despite more than fifteen years of research and negotiations, the
Dam operates under the same “modified low fluctuating flows”
116
regime as it did in 1996.
This lack of progress is discouraging
given the commitment of the AMP and its stakeholders to ongoing
adaptive management. Neither Congress nor the AMWG has
identified measurable goals for the AMP; nor has the AMWG made
the hard choices needed to prioritize competing uses of the
Colorado River. In particular, the Glen Canyon Dam AMP has yet
to resolve how power generation should be reconciled with
ecological and other uses that compete for the Dam’s resources.
For example, evidence from three, well-publicized controlled flood
experiments indicates that vulnerable species, particularly the
humpback chub, greatly benefit from seasonal flow changes, yet no
subsequent changes have been made to long-term operations to
117
incorporate such information.
The strongest opposition to flow regime change has come from
power generation interests. The Colorado River Storage Project
Act of 1956 mandates the maximization of power generation
revenues, provided that operations do not impinge on the
118
Colorado River Compact or other relevant compacts.
This
mandate gives power interests authorization to operate the Dam in
115. These goals for the AMP are embodied in the Vision and Mission Statement
approved by the group. GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF
THE
INTERIOR,
VISION
AND
MISSION
STATEMENT
(1999),
available
at
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/99oct21/Attach_02.pdf.
116. Feller, supra note 114, at 916.
117. Reese, supra note 42; Kubly, supra note 21.
118. The Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956, ch. 203 § 7, 43 U.S.C. § 620f (2008).
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119

a manner most beneficial to them, subject to other laws.
Controlled floods represent lost revenues to the power industry—
an estimated four million dollars in the case of the 2008
120
It is still not clear whether power interests will be
experiment.
compensated for this loss. It is unsurprising, given these losses, that
power interests are opposed to changes in the Dam’s operation.
The group seems incapable of fashioning creative solutions that
121
By this time, relatively stable voting
meet multiple interests.
blocks have formed. Our review of motions voted on since the
AMWG was created confirms that factions are entrenched:
environmental organizations, paddlers, the Fish and Wildlife
Service, and the National Park Service regularly find themselves on
one side, while the states and power generators are often on the
122
other.
B. The AMP Has Been Unable to Avert Unproductive ExtraProgrammatic Conflict
Lawsuits filed as early as 1973, only ten years after the Dam was
123
completed, challenged various resource management decisions.
Indeed, it was a legal victory won by environmental groups—
124
National Wildlife Federation v. Western Area Power Administration —
119. Id. at ch. 203 § 1, 43 U.S.C. § 620.
120. Reese, supra note 42.
121. Id.
122. Other interest groups, including the tribes, are less predictable, allying with different
partners depending on the issue. See, e.g., GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK
GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, MINUTES OF SEPT. 9–10, 2008 MEETING (2008), available
at
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/08sep09/Final_Mins_08sep09.pdf
(documenting that environmental and recreation interests, the National Park Service, and
two tribes opposed a motion to “direct the Technical Work Group to review the flow
levels . . . associated with each of the 158 archaeological sites that have been identified” while
other parties either supported or abstained from acting upon the motion); GLEN CANYON
DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, MINUTES OF AUG. 29–30,
2007
MEETING
(2007),
available
at
(documenting
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/07aug29/Final_Mins.pdf
that environment and rafting interests, the Park Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service
supported a motion to “[recommend] that the Secretary of the Interior implement
Seasonally-Adjusted Steady Flows in WY 2008” while other parties either opposed or
abstained from acting upon the motion).
123. The first lawsuit was Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 360 F. Supp. 165 (C.D. Utah
1973), which sought to force the U.S. Bureau of Interior to keep Lake Powell’s water out of
Rainbow Bridge National Monument.
124. See National Wildlife Fed’n v. W. Area Power Admin., No. 88-C-11750 (C.D. Utah
Sept. 29, 1989) (order granting injunction).
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that led to the creation of the AMP in the first place. The AMP was
created to facilitate conflict resolution without resorting to
litigation. Under an effective collaborative adaptive management
program, stakeholders would reflect jointly on what they had
learned and engage in collaborative problem solving to improve
the Dam’s operations. Unfortunately, under the Glen Canyon
AMP, stakeholders hold fast to their positions and continue to
spend time and resources challenging each other. As a result of
the lack of progress, AMWG members have turned to litigation
rather than reliance on the AMWG to resolve disputes over dam
operations.
In 2006, five environmental organizations sued the Bureau of
Reclamation over the impacts the Dam continues to have on
endangered species like the humpback chub. This suit was settled
when the Bureau of Reclamation agreed to conduct a new study of
native fish and habitats in concert with the Fish and Wildlife
Service. 125 The Grand Canyon Trust, an environmental group and
member of the AMWG, filed a lawsuit against the Bureau of
Reclamation in December 2007 accusing the agency of managing
water releases to benefit power generators at the expense of the
126
downstream fish habitat.
In March 2008, the Grand Canyon
Trust and Earthjustice filed a complaint against the Bureau of
Reclamation and the Fish and Wildlife Service, alleging
127
Endangered Species Act violations.
United States District Judge
David Campbell ruled against the Fish and Wildlife Service in May
2009, requiring the agency to reconsider its approach to evaluating
128
the Dam’s impacts on humpback chub.

125. Press Release, Western Environmental Law Center, New Environmental Study on
Grand Canyon’s Native Fishes and Habitat—Impacts of Glen Canyon Dam (Sept. 5, 2006),
available at http://www.westernlaw.org/pressroom/press-releases/new-environmental-studyon-grand-canyons-native-fishes-and-habitat-impacts-of-glen-canyon-dam.
126. New Suit Filed Over Glen Canyon Dam, DESERET NEWS, Dec. 9, 2007, at B12, available at
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/1,5143,695234557,00.html.
127. Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Grand Canyon Trust
v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. CV-07-8164-DGC (D. Ariz.
Mar. 17, 2008); Grand Canyon Trust, The Grand Canyon Trust Sues Reclamation Over ESA,
NEPA,
and
GCPA
Claims,
http://www.grandcanyontrust.org/grandcanyon/river_actions_litigation.php (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
128. Grand Canyon Trust v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 623 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1043 (D.
Ariz. 2009); April Reese, FWS Must Reconsider Dam’s Effects on Grand Canyon Chub, LAND
LETTER, May 28, 2009.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1572720

SUSSKIND MACRO 3.1.10

28

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

3/1/2010 7:45:58 PM

[Vol. 35:1

C. The Downriver Ecology is Still in Jeopardy
In 2008, the Fish and Wildlife Service reiterated that the
ecosystem below the Dam has been heavily modified from its pre129
dam state.
Federal agencies are attempting to ameliorate the
situation by making further flow modifications and removing
nonnative species, but the changing stream flow (particularly
coldwater releases and unnatural flow regimes caused by the Dam)
and land use changes have greatly diminished the species’
130
habitat. The humpback chub thrive in warm, sediment-rich flows
that create fast moving currents, eddies, and associated beach
131
formations.
The Fish and Wildlife Service postulates that,
historically, humpback chub were found throughout the Grand
Canyon, while today they are largely confined to a few sections and
tributaries that remain largely undisturbed by human intervention.
According to the Fish and Wildlife Service, “[m]any of the physical
changes in the post-dam Colorado River are believed to have
contributed to eliminating spawning and recruitment of humpback
132
chub in the mainstem river.”
The precarious state of the downriver ecology is particularly
disconcerting because anticipated stressors, such as climate change,
are likely to strain the ecosystem even further. Fish and Wildlife
acknowledges that the effects of climate change should factor into
how the Dam is operated, as the low reservoir levels associated with
droughts from 2004 to 2006 demonstrate the potential for climate
133
change to impact humpback chub.
Perhaps more disturbingly,
recent findings by University of Colorado researchers suggest that
climate change and population growth could dry up the Colorado
134
River’s reservoir by 2057.
This would profoundly impact human
settlements, agriculture, and the riverine environment.
Recent evidence suggests that the humpback chub may have
temporarily benefitted from recent temporary high-flow releases.
These releases are byproducts of AMP experiments with various
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

FINAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 23, at 21.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 13–15.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 34.
Lauren Morello, Climate, Population Growth Could Dry Up Colorado River by 2057,
June
21,
2009,
available
at
CLIMATEWIRE,
http://www.eenews.net/public/climatewire/2009/07/21/2.
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flow regimes used to assess the impacts on species populations and
135
ecosystem health starting in 1996.
The U.S. Geological Survey
(“USGS”) reported in April 2009 that humpback chub populations
increased by fifty percent between 2001 and 2008, a significant
136
recovery after steady declines in the 1990s.
The USGS
acknowledges the difficulty of determining why the population
rebounded, but argues that the experimental water releases are
137
probably one factor.
One might consider the humpback chub’s recovery to be
evidence that the AMP is doing its job. After years of research,
however, debates continue regarding whether or not flow regimes
should be permanently modified to protect the health of the chub
138
population.
Furthermore, the AMP’s reluctance to adopt a
139
modified flow regime or even to continue with high flow tests
suggests that any successes attributable to the experimental water
releases are only temporary and could be erased by the cessation of
controlled flooding. Though the DOI recently directed the
development of a protocol for conducting even more high-flow
140
experiments, the fact that ongoing dam operations have never
been formally changed to incorporate the apparent benefits of the
experimental releases on downriver ecosystems indicates the AMP’s
limited commitment to adaptive management and jeopardizes the
ancillary ecological benefits obtained through experimentation.
III. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE AMP AS A COLLABORATIVE
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
The AMP has failed to achieve its potential because it has not
addressed significant process management questions. Evidence
from a diverse range of complex, multi-party regulatory conflicts
has led scholars and dispute resolution professionals to
135. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
OPERATION OF GLEN CANYON DAM AND PROPOSED EXPERIMENTAL FLOWS FOR THE
COLORADO RIVER BELOW GLEN CANYON DAM DURING THE YEARS 2008–2012 14–15 (2007),
available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/envdocs/ba/gc-ExpFlow/2007BA.pdf.
136. ANDERSEN, supra note 60, at 2.
137. Id.
138. Reese, supra note 42.
139. Id.
140. See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Secretary Salazar Announces Initiative
to Protect Grand Canyon Resources While Meeting Water Needs (Dec. 10, 2009),
http://www.doi.gov/news/09_News_Releases/121009c.html.
ON THE
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recommend a set of “best practices” for managing environmental
141
The Consensus Building Handbook, the
and land use disputes.
product of a five-year effort by four dozen of America’s leading
dispute resolution professionals, reviews these best practices in
great detail, indicating how properly managed and structured
group decision-making and joint fact-finding efforts can lead to
142
workable agreements.
Although incorporating the Handbook’s
practices into a regulatory program does not guarantee full
resolution of very contentious resource disputes, there is
considerable evidence that doing so helps foster scientifically
credible agreements and creative long-term solutions to complex
143
resource problems.
Moreover, mounting evidence suggests that
both participants and outside observers are more satisfied when
these practices are followed, even if no final agreement is
144
reached.
In The Consensus Building Handbook, Susskind and ThomasLarmer outline how conflict assessment procedures should be used
to identify both the relevant stakeholders in a resource
management dispute and what issues ought to be addressed in
order to maximize the chance of reaching an informed
141. See generally THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds.,
1999) [hereinafter Susskind, CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK] (discussing strategies for
building consensus); LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., USING ASSISTED NEGOTIATION TO SETTLE
LAND USE DISPUTES: A GUIDEBOOK FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS (1999) (summarizing beneficial
practices regarding undertaking conflict assessment, selecting stakeholders, training
participants, setting an agenda, and establishing an advisory committee based on five case
studies involving the settlement of land use disputes); PATRICK FIELD ET AL., CONSENSUS
BUILDING INSTITUTE, INTEGRATING MEDIATION IN LAND USE DECISION MAKING (1999)
[hereinafter MEDIATION OF LAND USE DISPUTES], available at http://emcenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2009/10/Integrating%20Mediation%20in%20Land%20Use%20Decision
%20Making_FINAL2.pdf; Judith Innes & David Booher, Stories from the Field, in BEYOND
COLLABORATION: PLANNING AND PUBLIC POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (forthcoming) (on
file with authors); Judith Innes & David Booher, Collaborative Policymaking: Governance
Through Dialogue, in DELIBERATIVE POLICY ANALYSIS 33 (Maarten Hajer & Hendrik Wagenaar
eds., 2003); DAVID STRAUS, HOW TO MAKE COLLABORATION WORK (2002); DAVID D. CHRISLIP,
THE COLLABORATIVE LEADERSHIP FIELDBOOK (2002).
142. See generally Susskind, CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 141.
143. Kirk Emerson et al., Environmental Conflict Resolution: Evaluating Performance Outcomes
and Contributing Factors, 27 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 27, 57 (2009), available at
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/122614996/PDFSTART.
144. See Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices, supra note 3, at 304–11; Laura I. Langbein
& Cornelius M. Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation Versus Conventional Rulemaking: Claims, CounterClaims and Empirical Evidence, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 599, 625 (2000); Susskind,
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 4; MEDIATION OF LAND USE DISPUTES,
supra note 141, at 20–22.
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145

agreement.
Straus enumerates how to facilitate collaborative
efforts in order to ensure that all participants feel like they have
146
had a say in the design of the decision-making process.
Poirier
Elliott explains why professional neutrals regularly improve the
147
effective management of collaborative decision-making bodies.
Potapchuk and Crocker stress the importance of formulating
agreements that have a clear and accountable pathway to
148
Ehrmann and Stinson describe how
implementation.
stakeholders ought to engage with technical experts in joint fact149
finding.
Prescribing many of the same practices as The Consensus Building
Handbook, the DOI’s Adaptive Management Technical Guide
emphasizes the need for group learning and ongoing improvement
150
Unfortunately,
in how to manage collaborative decision-making.
as detailed below, the DOI has failed to incorporate at least six vital
practices for achieving truly collaborative and adaptive
management into the AMP’s design and operation. As a result, the
AMP has failed to cultivate meaningful relationships among the
stakeholders and has failed to develop the multilateral AMWG into
an effective, deliberative decision-making body.
The remainder of this article focuses on six best practices that,
according to our research, the AMP does not utilize: (1)
identifying appropriate stakeholder representatives; (2) setting
clear goals and involving stakeholders in developing a collaborative
process; (3) using professional neutrals when appropriate and
committing to building common ground; (4) incorporating joint
fact-finding to deal with scientific uncertainty; (5) producing
collectively supported written agreements; and (6) building longterm adaptive management capabilities. For each best practice, we
explain why it is central to collaborative adaptive management and
145. Lawrence Susskind & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, Conducting a Conflict Assessment, in
Susskind, CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 99, 107–30.
146. David A. Straus, Managing Meetings to Build Consensus, in Susskind, CONSENSUS
BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 287, 292–321.
147. Michael L. Poirier Elliott, The Role of Facilitators, Mediators, and Other Consensus
Building Practitioners, in Susskind, CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 199,
212–18.
148. William R. Potapchuck & Jarle Crocker, Implementing Consensus-Based Agreements, in
Susskind, CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 527, 548–51.
149. John R. Ehrmann & Barbara L. Stinson, Joint Fact-Finding and the Use of Technical
Experts, in Susskind, CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 375, 380–91.
150. TECHNICAL GUIDE, supra note 28.
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how, in our view, the AMP has failed to implement it successfully.
A. Identifying Appropriate Stakeholder Representatives
Ensuring that all influential and substantially affected parties are
151
at the table is critical to the success of any collaborative process.
If such a party is not included, the party will likely feel
unrepresented and might resort to other means to undermine what
152
Furthermore, if such a
the collaborative process has achieved.
party is not included, the collaborative body might miss out on
important input that could have contributed to reaching an even
153
better agreement.
The literature suggests that the best way to identify appropriate
stakeholder representatives is by commissioning a “conflict
assessment” in which a professional “neutral” conducts informal,
not-for-attribution interviews with a first group of stakeholders
154
recommended by the convener of the collaborative process.
As
part of these interviews, the professional neutral asks the
stakeholders with whom else he should speak. The process is
repeated until all relevant players have been included. Based on
these interviews, the neutral then suggests to the convener the
categories of relevant stakeholder groups and suggests who might
155
represent each stakeholder category in a collaborative process.
Often, a draft of the neutral’s proposal is circulated to everyone
156
who was interviewed before it is submitted to the convener.
In the case of the Glen Canyon Dam AMWG, the charter dictates
certain stakeholder groups who must be at the table and allows the
157
Secretary of the Interior to add parties at his or her discretion.
Where the charter does not stipulate specific representatives or
representative organizations for a given stakeholder group, the
158
This allows
Secretary of the Interior chooses the representative.
151. See Susskind & Thomas-Larmer, supra note 145, at 105.
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 100. A “professional neutral” is one that has expertise and experience in
helping stakeholders work through a process to resolve an issue, but does not have a direct
stake in the issue at hand. The “neutral” should be trusted and ideally chosen by all
stakeholders. Id. at 181–84.
155. Id. at 100–01.
156. Id. at 130.
157. WORK GROUP CHARTER, supra note 105, at 3.
158. Id.
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the Secretary to choose parties with whom it might be easiest to
work and exclude significant critics who might later challenge the
group’s decisions.
Ultimately, the AMP’s process for determining representation
was neither complete nor transparent, and likely the unfortunate
159
result of lobbying behind closed doors.
Meeting minutes from
the initial “Transition Work Group,” which was formed to operate
until the formal AMWG was constituted, provide surprisingly little
160
Transition
documentation of discussions about membership.
Work Group members expressed the need for diverse membership
and for an information-and-training session on membership
161
There appears to be no indication in the record,
requirements.
however, of how the Secretary of the Interior chose stakeholder
162
This lack of transparency raises substantial
representatives.
questions regarding the adequacy of AMWG representation and
ultimately the legitimacy of subsequent AMWG decisions.
The number or fraction of representatives from various
163
categories of stakeholder groups has also been criticized.
While
not of critical importance when a group operates by consensus,
group composition is very important when decisions are made by
majority or super-majority voting, because such dynamics may lead
to formation of coalitions that force issues through while ignoring
minority objections, as has happened with the AMP. Almost half of
159. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92, at 959.
160. GLEN CANYON DAM TRANSITION WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SUMMARY
OF TRANSITION WORK GROUP MEETING, MINUTES OF FEB. 3–4, 1997 MEETING (1997)
[hereinafter TRANSITION WORK GROUP MEETING FEBRUARY 1997], available at
http://www.riversimulator.org/Resources/GCDAMP/TWG1997to1999/97.02/Minutes.pdf.
161. Id. at 5.
162. Id. at 3–4.
163. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92, at 958–59 (“Though the [AMWG] is
reasonably diverse, there is still a question regarding whether the group is sufficiently
representative. This is in large part because of the operative rule chosen for voting on
AMWG decisions. The AMWG’s operating procedures dictate that ‘[t]he group should
attempt to seek consensus but, in the event that consensus is not possible, a vote should be
taken. . . . Approval of a motion requires a two-thirds majority of members present and
voting . . . . [The] AMWG demonstrates that decisions as to the structure of the regulatory
program—stakeholder group composition, the adopted decision rule, the convenor’s role in
decision-making—can function to allow a stakeholder group to suppress meaningful
participation and collaboration rather than cultivate it . . . . [W]hen the decision rule is less
than consensus, the exact composition becomes crucial, and the probative value of decisions
made by such a group is less clear. There is no clear, objective formula for deciding what
proportion of votes should be allocated to recreational, hydropower, and environmental
values and interests, let alone federal agencies, states, and tribes.”).
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the motions put forward at AMWG meetings between March 2004
164
Power generation interests have
and May 2008 went to a vote.
been able to garner a majority, and often a two-thirds majority,
frequently by obtaining the support of the states and sometimes the
tribes. For example, a motion to conduct no “Beach/HabitatBuilding Flows” in fiscal year 2005 was narrowly approved by a
margin of thirteen “yes” votes to six “no” votes and one abstention;
the meeting minutes suggest that the states teamed up with power
165
interests because of their desire to maximize power production.
Frustrated with this perceived imbalance against them,
environmental groups have turned to litigation, which clearly
undermines the consensus-oriented intention of the AMP
166
In part because the Secretary never invited open
process.
discussion of which stakeholders should participate and how many
167
votes each interest group has, the AMWG has fallen short of
functioning as a collaborative decision-making body for addressing
168
the resource conflicts surrounding the Glen Canyon Dam.
Instead, as evidenced by a majority of motions bypassing consensus
in favor of a vote, unbalanced representation has seemingly led
some parties to conclude that they are better off forcing a vote that
169
they can consistently win.
B. Providing Clear Goals and Involving Stakeholders in Developing
Operating Procedures that Guide the Collaborative Process
Best practices suggest that all stakeholders ought to have a
164. See GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
MINUTES OF MAR. 2004–MAY 2008 MEETINGS [hereinafter MEETING MINUTES MAR. 2004–MAY
2008], available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/mtgmin.html (select desired meeting
date from “Select 2006–2010 Meeting Date”; then follow “Draft Meeting Minutes” hyperlink)
(indicating that thirty-three of sixty-four motions went to a vote during this time period).
165. See GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
MINUTES
OF
AUG.
9–11,
2004
MEETING
18
(2004),
available
at
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/04aug09/Final_Mins.pdf.
166. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92, at 959–60.
167. TRANSITION WORK GROUP MEETING FEBRUARY 1997, supra note 160.
168. ROLES AD HOC GROUP, GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, DRAFT
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY’S DESIGNEE 3 (2007) [hereinafter
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS],
available
at
REPORT
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/07aug29/Attach_13a.pdf.
169. See id. See generally MEETING MINUTES MAR. 2004–MAY 2008, supra note 164
(indicating, for example, that of the five motions calling for modified flow releases during
this time, four went to a vote with the support of environmental groups but lost by
substantial margins).
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chance, before they come to the table, to participate in the design
of a collaborative process, including setting an agenda, drawing up
a timetable, deciding how data gathering or fact finding should
proceed, choosing technical advisors, setting a budget, and, most
importantly, selecting a neutral facilitator to manage meetings and
170
decision-making.
Existing evidence suggests that active
stakeholder involvement at an early stage is crucial to fostering a
workable and productive collaborative process; active stakeholders
typically take greater ownership of decision making and are more
171
likely to craft a process that pleases all affected parties.
Accordingly, to establish effective collaborative management,
Congress must provide clear guidance as to the program’s purposes
and make stakeholders responsible for effectuating these
objectives.
Unfortunately, Congress neither mandated meaningful
opportunities for stakeholder involvement nor provided clear
direction as to the goals and structure of the AMP. Even though
Congress retains the ultimate authority (and thus responsibility)
for specifying the AMP’s goals and design, Congress delegated the
172
In doing so,
responsibility to the Secretary of the Interior.
Congress failed both to set forth clear objectives for the new
program and to require ample opportunities for active stakeholder
involvement in refining the goals and crafting the decision-making
ground rules. Neither Congress nor the DOI provided participants
a significant role in establishing the AMP’s mandate or specifying
its operating procedures. For example, while members of the
Transition Work Group were given an opportunity to comment on
the draft charter introduced by a Bureau of Reclamation
170. See, e.g., Lawrence Susskind, An Alternative to Robert’s Rules of Order for Groups,
Organizations, and Ad Hoc Assemblies That Want to Operate by Consensus, in Susskind, CONSENSUS
BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 3, 39–42, 46 [hereinafter Susskind, An Alternative].
171. See SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 108, at 62–63 (“In [the Consensus Building
Approach], many more people are called upon to take an active problem-solving role—
doing work that engages them in what’s happening, learning about the problem, and
working to craft a solution. . . . Involving more people increases the chances that good ideas
will see the light of day and be dealt with in ways that build consensus.”).
172. Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, §§ 1801–1809, 106 Stat.
4600 (1992), available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/legal/gcpa1992.html. The
Secretary was responsible for interpreting the Act and Environmental Impact Assessment
that followed, and subsequently for the creation of the AMP. See Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive
Management Program, Background, http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/background.html
(last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
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representative, the draft was submitted to the Secretary of the
173
Interior in short order with few changes. Had Congress and DOI
followed best practices, stakeholders would have been intimately
involved in defining operating procedures from the beginning
rather than simply having the perfunctory opportunity to
comment. After the AMWG’s formation, the staff of the Secretary’s
Designee drafted the AMWG’s operating procedures at the group’s
174
behest.
The poor manner in which the AMP was designed was partly the
product of DOI officials’ interpretation of the FACA of 1972.
Congress passed FACA to enhance the accountability and
credibility of the various advisory committees created by federal
175
agencies.
While its intentions are laudable and the mechanisms
it mandates to guide the creation and operation of advisory
committees foster transparency, its requirements can be restrictive,
limiting opportunities for committees to craft the most contextually
appropriate solutions. Nonetheless, some collaborative processes
in America governed by FACA have incorporated the
176
aforementioned best practices.
The design of the AMP further failed to utilize best practices
because of stipulations that the Secretary of the Interior imposed
on its design. Under these stipulations, the Secretary’s designee
serves as AMP chair and is responsible for establishing agendas,
finalizing meeting minutes, and defining the outcomes the group
177
Extant procedures allow stakeholders to add items to
will seek.
the agenda and to speak on them at meetings; permit members of
the general public to speak; assure that dissenting opinions are
conveyed to the Secretary in the minutes; and mandate a response
from the Secretary regarding how recommendations are being
173. GLEN CANYON DAM TRANSITION WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SUMMARY
TRANSITION WORK GROUP MEETING, MINUTES OF MAY 21, 1996 MEETING (1996) (on file
with authors).
174. MEETING MINUTES SEPTEMBER 1997, supra note 107, at 3.
175. See U.S. General Services Administration, Federal Advisory Committee Act,
Management
Overview,
http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/contentView.do?contentType=GSA_OVERVIEW&conte
ntId=9673 (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
176. See generally Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32 (2000); Lawrence Susskind & G. McMahon, The Theory
and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133 (1985).
177. FINAL OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 108, at 1–4; REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 11.
OF
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178

used.
Even though these procedures provide stakeholders some
opportunity to participate, they ultimately confine stakeholders to
the conventional lobbying role and do not constitute a real system
of power-sharing.
Consequently, the DOI gives little consideration to the views of
AMWG members when making important management decisions
regarding the Glen Canyon Dam. For example, in January 2008
the Secretary’s Designee moved forward with a proposed
experimental test at the Dam without soliciting the AMWG’s
179
recommendations. Similarly, AMWG members complained there
was little discussion of the AMP’s fiscal year 2001 budgetary
allocation (H.R. 4733 of the Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Bill). Members claimed, “stakeholders received no
advance notice from Interior/Reclamation on HR 4733”; there was
“no AMWG meeting called to discuss and consequently no AMWG
consensus or recommendation on the proposed bill”; “one
stakeholder [went] outside the AMP process”; despite being within
the “institutional home” for the GCMRC, AMWG was “entirely
omitted” from the Appropriations Bill; and the “Secretary did not
respond to stakeholders who wrote letters . . . opposing the funding
180
cap.”
The absence of a clear regulatory mandate and stakeholder
responsibility for implementing this charge has led to further
problems. Beyond stakeholders having little say in how the AMP is
structured, uncertainty persists around how the AMWG, TWG,
GCMRC, and the IRP interact as well as what roles and
181
For example,
responsibilities these AMP components have.
AMWG members have asserted that they should have greater
influence over the technical work of the GCMRC, while the
182
GCMRC counters that it is not accountable to the AMWG.
178. FINAL OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 108, at 1–4; REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 11.
179. See Camacho, Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92, at 960 n.102.
180. GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
MINUTES
OF
JAN.
11–12,
2001
MEETING
2
(2001),
available
at
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/01jan11/Final_Mins.pdf.
181. See GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
STRATEGIC
PLAN
(2001)
[hereinafter
STRATEGIC
PLAN],
available
at
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/pdfs/sp_final.pdf.
182. See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 11. See also DOWNSTREAM,
supra note 74, at 6 (“The 1997 Strategic Plan defined adaptive management . . . [but] it is not
clear whether this definition is widely shared or whether stakeholders and scientists have
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Procedural confusion has sometimes been accompanied by
substantive disagreement. The AMP has failed, for example, to
183
agree on targets and priorities. By failing to delineate clearly the
functions and duties of different program components, Congress
and the Secretary of the Interior have not only detached
stakeholders from management, but have also unwittingly created a
muddled regulatory structure.
C. Committing to Identifying Common Ground and Cultivating
Consensus
Collaborative adaptive management is premised on a
commitment to promoting better understanding among
stakeholders and seeking to develop shared decision making. To
help accomplish this goal, best practices suggest that professional
neutrals (or neutral teams) often provide value by facilitating or
mediating the work of multiparty, ad hoc advisory, or collaborative
planning groups and by identifying and fostering common
184
Effective facilitation or mediation extends beyond the
ground.
management of face-to-face meetings. Professional neutrals know
how to work with parties “away from the table” to help them
prepare for meetings and to present and defend their views
185
effectively. Aside from the skill professional neutrals bring to the
management of group decision-making, evidence suggests that
their involvement increases the chances that the process will be
186
Ideally, professional neutrals also have relevant expertise
fair.
similar interpretations, particularly as it applies to Glen Canyon Dam operations and Grand
Canyon ecosystem management . . . . The operational roles of scientific monitoring and
research, and of the Center itself, remain unclear. A balance has not yet been reached
among the Center’s roles in conducting science programs, managing contracts, managing
information systems, responding to stakeholder requests, and synthesizing and
communicating monitoring and research results.”).
183. See Camacho, Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92, at 949–50 (“Tellingly, after a decade of
being in existence, ‘quantifiable targets have not been established for AMP goals including
the AMWG’s priority resources (humpback chub, sediment, and cultural resources)’ . . . .
Even supporters of the AMWG process concede that there has been and still is substantial
uncertainty regarding what the function of the AMWG should be in addressing this
regulatory dispute.”).
184. See Kirk Emerson et al., The Challenges of Environmental Conflict Resolution, in
ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 6, at 3, 11.
185. See generally Lawrence E. Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability
Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1 (1981) (discussing growing importance of mediation in
environmental disputes).
186. See Lawrence E. Susskind, Keynote Address: Consensus Building, Public Dispute
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that enables them to identify creative options that might meet each
party’s interests. Though an outside professional neutral is not
187
always needed for a group to work collaboratively, in many
situations outside mediators are more effective, as they are likely to
be more objective, have the greatest degree of impartiality, and the
188
greatest motivation to maintain confidentiality.
In its April 2007 Report and Recommendations to the Secretary’s
Designee, the Roles Ad Hoc Group—an AMWG committee formed
to review the AMWG’s progress—suggested that the level of
collaboration between Glen Canyon Dam stakeholders had actually
189
This represents a
fallen since the inception of the AMP process.
significant failure to bring parties together to develop outcomes
that are viewed as mutually beneficial, and raises a question about
how and whether the AMP leadership expected consensus to
emerge on key questions facing the group.
As mentioned previously, the Secretary’s designee chairs the
AMWG.
As a government employee and the Secretary’s
representative, the designee is not a “neutral.” Furthermore, no
designees thus far have been professional mediators, so they might
lack the skills needed to facilitate the work of a complex and
politically charged group like the Glen Canyon Dam AMP. The
designees, and their positions, have been:
•
•

Stephen Magnussen, Director, Operations for Reclamation (July
1997–February 2002);
Michael Gabaldon, Director, Policy, Management, and Technical
Services (February 2002–March 2006);

Resolution, and Social Justice, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 185, 185–203 (2008) (discussing nexus
between public dispute resolution and environmental justice concerns).
187. See Poirier Elliott, supra note 147, at 231 (“Facilitators may more often be drawn
from within an organization. This is particularly true when disputes spring from within a
single organization, the issues are relatively clear and demarcated, the facilitator has no
interest in the outcome of a decision, and the roles and responsibilities of the facilitator are
clear and well understood by participants.”) (internal citations omitted). Id. at 233
(“[Complex substantive issues, relationships, and process], in and of themselves, may not
require an independent, professional practitioner.”); Susskind, An Alternative, supra note 170,
at 3, 7–8, 24, 40.
188. Poirier Elliott, supra note 147, at 231–32.
189. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 3 (“There are several indications
that the level of collaboration among AMP participants have decreased since the inception
of the AMP in 1996, including failure of the various AMP groups to reach
consensus/agreement . . . . The Roles Ad Hoc Group believes that ineffective and possibly
insufficient collaboration is an underlying cause of contention, litigation threat, diminished
efficiency, and confused roles within the AMP.”).
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Mark Limbaugh, Assistant Secretary, Water and Science (March
2006–July 2007);
Brenda Burman, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Water and Science
(July 2007–July 2008);
Kameran Onley, Assistant Secretary, Water and Science (July
2008–August 2009); and
Anne Castle, Assistant Secretary, Water and Science (August
2009–present).

A review of the designees’ biographies confirms that all were
either career civil servants with technical backgrounds and
190
managerial experience or political appointees.
There is no
indication that any designee received significant training in dispute
resolution. Unsurprisingly, the Roles Ad Hoc Group reported that
AMWG members perceive a lack of clear communication between
191
The AMP lacked
the designees and the rest of the AMWG.
facilitation aimed at generating informed consensus.
Starting in 1999, the AMP used a trained dispute resolution
professional to help facilitate some of its meetings and to assist the
AMWG and TWG with strategic planning; however, because the
individual was a former stakeholder group member, it leaves the
AMWG vulnerable to claims that the individual was not sufficiently
192
neutral.
While she helped the Secretary’s designee organize,
190. See U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Biography of Stephen V. Magnussen, Acting
Commissioner, http://www.usbr.gov/history/CommissBios/magnussen.html (last visited
Jan. 22, 2010); U.S. Bureau of Reclamation: Biography of Michael Gabaldon, Director,
Technical
Resources,
http://www.usbr.gov/newsroom/presskit/bios/biosdetail.cfm?recordid=50 (last visited Jan.
22,
2010);
Ferguson
Group,
Biography
of
Mark
Limbaugh,
http://www.fergusongroup.us/team_biographies.htm#MarkLimbaugh (last visited Jan. 22,
2010); Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Brenda W. Burman Named Reclamation’s
Deputy Commissioner for External and Intergovernmental Affairs (June 7, 2006), available at
http://www.usbr.gov/newsroom/newsrelease/detail.cfm?RecordID=12222; Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Secretary Kempthorne Names Kameran Onley to Assume
Responsibilities of Assistant Secretary for Water and Science (July 13, 2007), available at
http://www.doi.gov/news/07_News_Releases/070713a.html; Memorandum from Ken
Salazar, Secretarial Designee for the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Working
Group,
available
at
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/pdfs/SecDesigneeApptmt.PDF; National Journal,
Profiles of Decision Makers in the Obama Administration—Anne Castle,
http://www.nationaljournal.com/decisionmakers/dm/310/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
191. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168.
192. See GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
MINUTES
OF
JULY
21–22,
1999
MEETING
(1999),
available
at
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/99jul21/Final_Minutes.pdf;
American
Rivers, About Us, http://www.americanrivers.org/about-us/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2010)
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plan, and run AMWG meetings, the dispute resolution
professional’s role in building consensus has also been somewhat
193
limited. Rather than empowering a professional neutral to devise
a consensus-based approach to move the stakeholders towards
outcomes based on “joint gains,” the AMP lodges decision-making
authority with the Secretary’s designee and grants this individual
194
the authority to move a motion to a vote at his or her discretion.
Furthermore, the dispute resolution specialist has had almost no
engagement with stakeholders outside of formal meetings, nor has
she dealt with other actors as an AMP representative, despite the
195
No
Role Ad Hoc Group’s recognition that such help is needed.
record in the AMWG minutes suggests that stakeholders played a
role in reviewing candidates for the facilitator’s job, or in preparing
the contract that spelled out the terms and conditions of her
196
hiring. All of these deficiencies suggest that little or no attention
was given to involving professional neutrals in group decisionmaking or more generally to promoting collaborative decisionmaking.
In fact, as structured, the AMWG provides little opportunity for,
197
For example,
or encouragement of, consensus building.
(stating American Rivers, which the facilitator represented at the July 1999 meeting, is “the
leading conservation organization standing up for healthy rivers so communities can thrive.
American Rivers protects and restores America’s rivers for the benefit of people, wildlife, and
nature.”); see also GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
INTERIOR, FINAL MINUTES OF JANUARY 11–12, 2001 MEETING 9 (2001), available at
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/01jan11/Final_Mins.pdf
(detailing
perceived concerns of bias raised in a performance evaluation survey the facilitator
conducted in 2000).
193. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 6 (stating that “facilitation and
mediation expertise [should be used] more broadly throughout the AMP,” including within
the TWG and outside of the formal process via trips and exercises to build trust and foster
collaboration).
194. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92, at 958–59 (“The exact point in time when
consensus may be established to be impossible—thus paving the way for a super-majority
vote—is never delineated in the AMWG’s operating procedures. The Secretary’s Designee,
not the mediator-facilitator, decides on his or her own option when to switch to a two-thirds
vote . . . . As there are no time constraints or other detailed protocols governing when to
seek consensus and when to follow a two-thirds decision rule, the convenor’s discretion
becomes of critical importance in determining how the AMWG actually functions.”).
195. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 6 (suggesting the need to
“[u]pdate or develop a charter and operating procedures for all the elements of the AMP
(AMWG, TWG, GCMRC, and Secretary’s Designee) to reflect a more collaborative
approach.”).
196. See generally MEETING MINUTES, supra note 43.
197. Consensus building can be understood as the longer-term process of building trust
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participants reached consensus on only half of the motions put
198
Even
before the AMWG between March 2004 and May 2008.
though consensus is a stated goal of AMWG meetings, the
Secretary’s designee can simply choose to take a vote at any time,
meaning that one side can force the motion to a vote when it
199
senses it can prevail.
Since building consensus requires
200
quick voting undercuts the
significant time and resources,
commitment to consensus and encourages each party to focus on
building a “winning coalition” rather than searching for a creative
201
As the Roles Ad Hoc
solution that meets everyone’s interests.
Group recommends, parties need to “establish and agree to a
202
common mission/goal for the AMP”; the AMP should “create
incentives for participants to work collaboratively to achieve
203
common goals and desired future resources conditions”; the
AMP should “create incentives for participants to work
collaboratively to achieve common goals and desired future
204
resources conditions”; and the group should “update or develop
a charter and operating procedures for all the elements of the AMP
(AMWG, TWG, GCMRC, and Secretary’s Designee) to reflect a
205
more collaborative approach.”
The rigidity of the AMWG’s procedure for developing agendas
and structuring meetings—some of which FACA mandates—
206
inhibits the creativity and flexibility consensus building requires.
and understanding between parties so that they start to look for creative mutual gains rather
than approaching all issues from their narrow entrenched interests. Consensus does not
require unanimity, although it usually involves seeking unanimity but settling for
overwhelming agreement after all parties have had a chance to present their views and
suggestions. See generally Susskind, CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 141;
SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 108, at 5.
198. See MEETING MINUTES MAR. 2004–MAY 2008, supra note 164.
199. FINAL OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 108, at 3.
200. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 3 (“[C]ollaborative processes are
frequently expensive and time consuming, especially in resolving issues where conflict is
extensive.”).
201. Lawrence E. Susskind & Larry Crump, Introduction—Multiparty Negotiation: Theory
and Practice of Public Dispute Resolution, in 2 MULTIPARTY NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF PUBLIC DISPUTES RESOLUTION vii–xii (2008).
202. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 4.
203. Id. at 5.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 6.
206. See FINAL OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 108, at 2–3 (“The maker of a motion
must clearly and concisely state and explain his or her motion. Motions may be made
verbally or submitted in writing in advance of the meeting . . . . After a motion there should
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The AMWG’s procedures more closely resemble those of a formal
body following Robert’s Rules of Order than those of a more
informal, problem-solving group following a consensus-based
207
In fact, the group explicitly agreed early on to follow
approach.
208
Robert’s Rules, while allowing for some flexibility.
Frustration caused by some groups’ ability to get their way
without having to seek broad consensus has inevitably led to a loss
of faith in the process among those who regularly find themselves
209
on the losing side.
We attribute this in part to a failure to
commit to the best practices associated with consensus building,
particularly the appointment of a professional neutral selected by
the full group.
As noted previously, in the absence of a
commitment to consensus building, the parties have turned to
other tactics, primarily litigation.
D. Establishing and Following Clear Joint Fact-Finding Procedures
Disagreements about “the facts” are critical to many disputes.
Each party has its own understanding of what is happening on the
ground and typically amasses evidence to substantiate and
reinforce its own perceptions. In many situations, one side hires
technical experts to prove they are right. Of course, other parties
view such findings with skepticism, and, when they can afford to,
hire their own technical experts to contradict the other side’s
experts.
Joint fact-finding (“JFF”)—a best practice that suggests data

be presentations by staff followed by a discussion and a call for questions. The public will be
given opportunity to comment during the question period as allowed by the
Chairperson . . . . The group should attempt to seek consensus but, in the event that
consensus is not possible, a vote should be taken. Voting shall be by verbal indication or by
raised hand. Approval of a motion requires a two-thirds majority of members present and
voting.”).
207. The AMWG generally adheres to Robert’s Rules of Order. See FINAL OPERATING
PROCEDURES, supra note 108, at 1. For a contrast between Robert’s Rules and a consensusbased approach, see SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 108.
208. MEETING MINUTES SEPTEMBER 1997, supra note 107, at 4–5.
209. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92, at 959–60 (“[A]n AMWG’s ad hoc
committee concluded that ‘some stakeholders feel disenfranchised because some interests
have more representation on the group; this is especially significant when consensus is not
achieved and issues get resolved by a vote.’ . . . [S]takeholders consistently in the minority
are increasingly seeing little incentive to expend their limited resources in a process that
consistently ignores them, turning instead to costly litigation to address issues the AMWG has
not confronted.”).
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ought to be gathered jointly—provides a way to move beyond such
210
When engaged in JFF, parties work together to
stalemates.
identify what they need to know and to select independent experts
211
that they all agree are credible.
After working together with the
experts to design the relevant research and reviewing the
preliminary findings together, the parties might interpret the
expert’s findings differently, but they will have little reason to reject
212
By moving
the legitimacy of the data that has been collected.
beyond disagreements about data, the parties can address more
substantive issues, like the significance of the data and the
213
appropriate responses to it.
Of course, uncertainty may persist under JFF, and new data will
affect the parties’ understandings of the issue; however, the aim of
JFF is not to develop an absolutely conclusive set of facts, but rather
to reach tentative agreement on the facts at a given time in the
process and to allow for collaborative research and subsequent
214
Indeed, adaptive
evolution in management as more is learned.
management is premised on the notion of recurring monitoring
215
and research, and adaptation to new information.
Effective
adaptive management programs do not pretend to have all of the
answers, nor do they allow uncertainty to cripple decision-making;
rather, they facilitate agreement on what is known and unknown at
a given point, what decisions should be made in light of this
information, and what information should be collected moving
216
forward.
To the AMP’s credit, the parties do have the ability to craft
research questions through the TWG, and unlike other
experimental initiatives like the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s
217
Habitat Conservation Plan program, the AMP includes a well210. Ehrmann & Stinson, supra note 149, at 375–99; Lawrence Susskind et al., Integrating
Scientific Information, Stakeholder Interests, and Political Concerns, in INTEGRATED RESOURCE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 181 (D. Scott Slocombe & Kevin S.
Hanna eds., 2007).
211. Ehrmann & Stinson, supra note 149, at 375–99.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. TECHNICAL GUIDE, supra note 28, at v.
216. See generally Lee, Appraising Adaptive Management, supra note 28, at 3; ADAPTIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE (Catherine Allen & George Henry
Stankey eds., 2009).
217. See Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve?, supra note 3, at 337.
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funded scientific monitoring and research apparatus—the
GCMRC. The GCMRC is responsible for most of the research used
by the AMWG, either directly or indirectly. Its mission is “[t]o
provide credible, objective scientific information to the Glen
Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program on the effects of
operating Glen Canyon Dam on the downstream resources of the
Colorado River ecosystem, utilizing an ecosystem science
218
approach.”
If the AMP were to provide clear guidance establishing the
GCMRC’s scientific neutrality while giving the AMWG the authority
and responsibility to identify research priorities, this would enable
the GCMRC to have the rare capacity to assist the AMWG in
making long-term resource management decisions; however, such
guidance has not been forthcoming. Neither Congress nor the
DOI has provided clear direction regarding the goals of the AMP
or the “chain of command” between the AMWG and the
219
As a result, GCMRC officials claim that the AMWG has
GCMRC.
failed to provide clear guidance to the GCMRC on the scientific
220
questions that the GCMRC should investigate.
On the other
hand, some AMWG members have claimed that the GCMRC
221
remains purposefully ignorant of their needs.
As an arms-length
government body, the GCMRC is responsible for providing data to
the AMWG and TWG, but is not under the AMWG and TWG’s
222
Since all GCMRC staff are government employees or
direction.
contractors, AMWG and TWG members have little or no say about
whom the GCMRC hires on contract or what their work shall
223
entail.
The AMP has used Independent Review Panels to make factfinding efforts more objective and credible, but like the GCMRC,
these panels are not directly associated with the AMWG. The

218. Glen
Canyon
Monitoring
and
Research
Center,
About
GCMRC,
http://www.gcmrc.gov/about/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
219. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92, at 949–53.
220. Id. at 955 n.77.
221. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 18 (“Some feel the GCMRC does
not want to be responsive to the needs of the AMP. . . . Some AMP members feel that
GCMRC appears to have made unilateral changes in approved documents, work plans, and
budgets without communicating with AMWG, which has reduced the level of trust between
AMP members and GCMRC.”).
222. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 9.
223. Id. at 17–22.
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panels, which include a Science Advisory Board comprised of
respected academic experts, assess and monitor the credibility of
224
GCMRC program proposals and outputs. Yet, because the panels
are set up by and report to the GCMRC, their reviews are not
responsive to the interests and concerns of the AMP’s stakeholders.
Furthermore, some AMWG members argue that advisory board
members are not forthright in their criticism out of fear of
offending the research center and their contract staff, thereby
225
putting them at risk of losing future work.
The panels and the GCMRC are convened on the premise that
distinguished experts can add legitimacy to the regulatory process
at Glen Canyon Dam because these experts stand above the
political fray. Even so, though scientists regularly provide crucial
information that can help resolve natural resource disputes—
including assessments of the potential tradeoffs of alternative
strategies—technical analysis should only inform, and not dictate,
226
By allowing the GCMRC and
political decision-making.
independent review panels to operate without being responsive or
accountable to the AMWG, Congress and the Department of the
Interior severely crippled the AMWG’s ability to manage
uncertainty regarding the questions central to the Dam’s
management. Because scientists alone cannot provide definitive
and objective answers on the priorities for management or an
optimal resolution of policy tradeoffs, stakeholders must be
engaged in defining researchable questions and analyzing the
results of any technical studies undertaken.
The dispute surrounding the AMP’s much-publicized
experimental flood releases exemplifies the prolonged and
unproductive conflicts that result from the AMP’s inadequate factfinding procedures. The GCMRC has conducted a variety of
experiments to understand the Dam’s impacts on the downstream
224. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 110.
225. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 25 (“Some believe that the
Science Advisors (SAs) do not always forward clear critiques, . . . comments, and
recommendations because they may not want to offend GCMRC and contract scientists.
However, the lack of clarity causes difficulty among managers in resolving a course of
action.”).
226. N. LeRoy Poff et al., River Flows and Water Wars: Emerging Science for Environmental
Decision-Making, 1(6) FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY & ENVT. 298, 301–02 (2003), available at
http://www.esajournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1890/1540295(2003)001%5B0298:RFAWWE%5D2.0.CO%3B2?cookieSet=1.
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227

ecosystem as well as to test out various flow regimes.
Many of
these experiments have involved releasing different volumes of
228
water over different time periods and evaluating the results.
Because AMWG members have had less input in crafting the
research program than they would in a true joint fact-finding
process, stakeholder criticism of how research has been conducted
is inevitable. The most controversial issues during these tests have
included: interpreting the impacts of high-flow releases on the
river, beach development, and conditions for indigenous species
and the trout fishery; deciding what experiments should be
conducted and when; deciding how such impacts should be
229
measured; and agreeing on what the ideal outcome should be.
For example, at the August 2007 AMWG meeting, an
environmental representative voiced concern that the monitoring
230
and research plan did not represent a true ecosystem approach.
At the April 29–30, 2009 meeting, the states and power interests
voted against a motion to conduct high flow experiments in fiscal
year 2010–11, ostensibly because they felt that the results of the
231
Though
2008 high flow experiment should be interpreted first.
stakeholders might criticize research even under a joint fact-finding
process, the failure to include stakeholders in shaping the research
agenda unnecessarily increased the potential for conflict and
delegitimized the data-gathering process.
Because they were peripheral to the research program’s design,
stakeholders also have not treated the research findings as tools for
facilitating joint problem solving, but rather used them as
ammunition to advance their own positions. For example, at the
227. FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 51, at 3–6.
228. Id.
229. See generally MEETING MINUTES, supra note 43.
230. FINAL MEETING MINUTES AUGUST 2007, supra note 64, at 4.
“[T]he
231. FINAL MEETING MINUTES APRIL 2009, supra note 52, at 12–13.
[Environmental Assessment] and the [Biological Assessment] both are pretty specific about
what additional work needs to be done before more . . . High Flow Experiments or
Beach/Habitat-Building Flows, are to be conducted and there is a requirement in the EA
that full scientific and public analysis of the 2008 experiment be completed. There is
language to that effect in the BA that says there will be the development of predictive and
other analytic tools to inform future tests before they’re done and that there will not be a
proposal to do additional high flow tests until the information from the 2008 HFE is fully
analyzed . . . . And as we know from the presentations yesterday . . . some of that won’t be
completed until the end of fiscal year 2010.” Id. at 12. Despite this opposition, the Secretary
of the Interior recently directed the development of a protocol for conducting further
experimental high flows. See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 140.
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April 2009 meeting, rafting and endangered species advocates cited
the success that modified flow regimes had in restoring sandbars as
232
reason to lobby for their long-term use.
Since high-flow releases
appear to provide habitats for endangered species, the AMP may
continue to use such releases to comply with the Endangered
233
Hydropower interests, on the other hand, cite
Species Act.
significant revenue losses and problems with meeting electricity
234
demand when flows are not regulated based on power needs.
Thus, they advocate maintaining the status quo of traditional
235
release patterns, which maximize power generation revenues.
A well-designed JFF process would not eliminate such arguments.
It would, however, require each stakeholder to acknowledge those
aspects of its policy advice that are based on fact and those that
reflect subjective judgments or wishful thinking. As each group
advocates a particular policy choice, the factual bases for its
prescriptions would be clear to all sides.
AMP stakeholders have also used the absence of a clearly
236
Uncertainty can
delineated fact-finding process as a delay tactic.
never be fully eliminated, but parties who benefit from the status
quo demand that changes be made based only on selective
information and perpetuate claims of uncertainty by challenging
237
A clear joint fact-finding process
the results of experiments.
could help limit opportunities for delay and other adversarial, selfseeking behavior on the part of stakeholders by managing
uncertainty, moving the process toward agreement on the
232. FINAL MEETING MINUTES APRIL 2009, supra note 52, at 12–13.
233. FINAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 23, at 23.
234. FINAL MEETING MINUTES APRIL 2009, supra note 52, at 14.
235. See generally MEETING MINUTES, supra note 43. For example, during the August 2004
meeting, the following was raised: “Anything that can be done to lessen the impact to the
basin fund would be good. Given the drought conditions, it may be better to go to existing
powerplant conditions and provide a bridge so as to not impact the basin fund. He added
that they may be putting the AMP in jeopardy if they ask for money from Congress and then
let money out of the fund when money could be generated by the power revenues.” FINAL
MEETING MINUTES AUGUST 2004, supra note 43, at 17. Similarly, challenges from
stakeholders who claim the tests are not worth their environmental impacts and that the tests
may contravene the Law of the River undermine the usefulness of these experiments. For
example, a motion to implement seasonally-adjusted steady flows in 2008 was opposed by an
AMWG member on the grounds that reduced power generation might lead to more
greenhouse gas emitting coal-fired power generation. FINAL MEETING MINUTES AUGUST
2007, supra note 64.
236. See Reese, supra note 42.
237. Id.
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legitimacy of the underlying data, and providing a framework for
238
constantly improving that data.
In short, the AMP can and should implement a joint fact-finding
process. The stakeholder-comprised TWG has the capacity to
formulate researchable questions, and the GCMRC has the
resources and objectivity to play a major role in conducting and
managing the research process. Effective joint fact-finding remains
elusive, however, due to the lack of stakeholder support and the
absence of a clear relationship between the AMWG and the
GCMRC. As a result, factual conflict is often the main issue
between stakeholders, preventing the AMP from focusing its energy
on collaborative decision making.
E. Producing Collectively Supported and Functional Written
Agreements
Best practices suggest that a collaborative process, especially one
that is explicitly designed to generate decisions, should produce a
text used for negotiation that all parties can ultimately sign and
that spells out agreements that have been reached along with
239
commitments the parties have made.
Preparing minutes or
summaries of meetings does not suffice. Rather, drafting possible
terms of a written agreement in the process of negotiating
“provides a record of discussions” and “reduc[es] the chance of
240
A written record of discussions should
later misunderstanding.”
also include places for the parties to indicate their personal
commitments to help implement what has been worked out,
regardless of whether they have the legal authority to enter into
241
enforceable contracts.
In the case of Glen Canyon Dam, the stakeholders have not
developed written agreements that address the core issues before
238. Ehrmann & Stinson, supra note 149, at 376 (“Joint fact-finding is a central
component of many consensus building processes; it extends the interest-based, cooperative
efforts of parties engaged in consensus building into the realm of information gathering and
scientific analysis. In joint fact-finding, stakeholders with differing viewpoints and interests
work together to develop data and information, analyze facts and forecasts, develop common
assumptions and informed opinion, and . . . reach decisions together.”).
239. LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL
APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 14–34 (1987).
240. ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING
IN 172 (2d ed. 1991).
241. SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 108, at 134.
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the AMP. The AMP has adopted a strategic plan that includes a
mission statement and lists a range of goals for the Colorado River
242
ecosystem.
Despite this, many of the “desired resource
conditions” stated in the strategic plan are not necessarily
compatible. For example, it is far from clear that the goals (1)
“[to] maintain or attain viable populations of existing native fish,
remove jeopardy from humpback chub and razorback sucker, and
prevent adverse modification to their critical habitat” and (2) “[to]
[m]aintain power production capacity and energy generation, and
increase where feasible and advisable, within the framework of the
Adaptive Management ecosystem goals” can be achieved
243
The strategic plan outlines the positions and
simultaneously.
roles of the various stakeholders and program components,
introduces the boundaries set by relevant legislation, and notes that
244
conflicts may emerge between efforts to meet the various goals.
However, the strategic plan offers no guidance as to how to
reconcile these conflicts. Because of its focus on integrating
research findings into management decisions, the strategic plan
seems to expect that conflicts can be overcome with more and
245
better information.
While accurate and generally-accepted facts are needed, even the
best joint fact-finding cannot overcome inherently conflicting uses
of the same limited resource. As a result of these limitations, the
Roles Ad Hoc Group found that the underlying conflicts among
the listed goals have not been resolved, that no quantifiable targets
had been established for any of the AMP’s goals, and that many
stakeholders had “never committed to defining or achieving
specific resources objectives or desired future resource
246
Rather than spending time on these fundamental
conditions.”
issues, the AMWG has focused instead on “the details of the AMP,
247
sometimes duplicating TWG efforts.”
Again, this failure can at
least in part be attributed to Congress’s failure to clarify program
248
goals and the relative status of resource uses under the GCPA.
The AMWG has also been ineffective because the parties have
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

See STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 181, at 10–11.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 2–7.
Id. at 44.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 5.
Id. at 8.
See supra Part III.B.
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never agreed on how AMWG recommendations will be factored
into decision-making by the Secretary of the Interior. After each
AMWG meeting, the Secretary’s designee unilaterally prepares a
“formal summary report” for the Secretary and sends copies to
participants without providing any opportunity for participants to
249
comment.
Although the designee must represent dissenting
opinions to the Secretary when consensus is not reached, the
designee remains free to interpret the outcomes and report in the
manner he or she wishes. The Secretary, in consultation with
agency management, is the sole decision maker on how AMWG
250
recommendations are incorporated into formal actions; the only
stipulation is that the Secretary’s decisions be reported back to
251
AMWG members.
Members have expressed concern regarding
the lack of communication and the opaque manner in which
252
decisions are made.
Responses from the Secretary are rare and
253
Because AMWG members
vary widely in their substantive detail.
have no ownership of and make no commitment to the agreements
reached, and the Secretary is completely free to make decisions
with no accountability to the group, stakeholders have incentives to
circumvent the collaborative process and lobby the Secretary or
254
others directly.
F. Managing the AMP Adaptively and Cultivating Long-Term
Capacity Building
Best practice suggests that adaptive resource management is a
long-term task that requires the building of ongoing institutional

249. FINAL OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 108, at 2.
250. See STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 181, at 44.
251. Id.
252. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 11.
253. Compare Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of the Interior Lynn Scarlett to Glen
Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Work Group (May 21, 2007), available at
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/07may22CC/Attach_07.pdf
(containing
itemized responses to each recommendation the AMWG submitted), with Memorandum
from Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton to Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management
Work
Group
(Mar.
3,
2006),
available
at
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/06mar07/Attach_02b.pdf
(introducing
restructuring within the Department as it relates to the AMP, but providing neither
explanations as to how this will impact AMWG members, nor responses to recent
recommendations).
254. See Camacho, Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92, at 950–52.
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255

and organizational capacity.
Adaptive management should
include not only systematic monitoring, assessment, and adaptation
in response to individual regulatory decisions made by the
stakeholder group, but also reconsideration of the regulatory
256
This approach allows the convener, the
program itself.
stakeholders, and the broader public to evaluate a program’s
progress toward meeting public goals, and enhances the
institutional capacity to follow through on commitments that have
been made. Further, a long-term oriented approach helps ensure
that the group learns from mistakes and gets better at dealing with
each successive round of adjustments required in an on-going
adaptive management process.
Despite the AMP’s asserted emphasis on adaptation, the program
has failed to engage in genuine adaptive natural resource
management—both in its concrete decisions concerning resource
allocation and in how it manages the AMP itself. For example,
though the AMP’s highly publicized experimental flood releases
from the Glen Canyon Dam have been much celebrated, they are,
in fact, examples of missed opportunities to engage in adaptive
natural resource management. The floods certainly provided the
AMP with important scientific data about the Colorado River’s
downstream hydrology and ecosystems, but the information gained
did not modify operations at Glen Canyon Dam. In other words,
there was no adaptive management. To date, a decade after the
establishment of the AMP, no adjustments to long-term
257
management operations of the Dam have been made.
The Secretary of the Interior recently directed the development
258
of a protocol for conducting additional experimental high flows.
Unfortunately, this new release regime seems to signal that the
program will not be relying on the short-term releases primarily as
iterative experiments for making long-term management decisions
about Dam operating criteria but rather as tools for engaging in
stop-gap natural resource management. While perhaps more
favorable for the downriver ecosystem than the current low flow
regime, such an approach does not demonstrate a rigorous
255. See Christopher W. Moore & Peter J. Woodrow, Collaborative Problem Solving within
Organizations, in Susskind, CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 591, 591–630.
256. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve?, supra note 3, at 342–44.
257. Reese, supra note 42; Camacho, Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92, at 957.
258. See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 140.
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commitment to adaptive management.
In addition to failing to commit to using the information gleaned
from regulatory experiments to adjust long-term management
protocols at Glen Canyon Dam, little or no attention is being paid
to building the AMWG’s and AMP’s long-term capacity. The only
attempt to assess the AMP’s progress was to form the Roles Ad Hoc
Group. However, the Roles Ad Hoc Group’s recommendations for
improving the AMP have been neither adopted nor formally
259
Furthermore,
rejected by either the AMWG or the DOI.
stakeholder representatives have identified technical weaknesses
and difficulties in meeting the AMP’s participatory requirements,
but the DOI has provided no training or organizational
260
development investments in response.
Programmatic evaluations are necessary to foster ongoing
improvements, but the AMP has failed to commit the resources
needed. While some efforts have been made to enhance meeting
management, there has been no effort to systematically evaluate
261
the process or to even monitor it on a regular basis.
The
National Research Council has suggested that an adaptive
management specialist—someone who can help parties deal with
the tension between research and policy decisions—is sorely
262
Without incorporating a
lacking and would be invaluable.
systematic approach to monitoring and adapting the program, the
agency, stakeholders, Congress, and the public are crippled in their
259. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92, at 950 n.50.
260. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 13. “Some TWG members
appear to lack technical training that would enhance their contribution toward success of
the group.” Id. “Many TWG members are unwilling or unable to fully participate in work
efforts required to meet deadlines and commitments.” Id. at 15.
261. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92, at 955–56 (“[While] the AMP does
incorporate an experimentalist approach to resource management that attempts to monitor,
evaluate, and adjust regulatory decisions during implementation, Congress, the Secretary,
and the AMWG have not developed a similar feedback mechanism at a more macroscopic,
programmatic level: to monitor, evaluate, and adjust the regulatory program in response to
information gleaned as the AMP has aged over the past decade . . . . The AMP does not
systematically monitor and evaluate whether the regulatory program’s processes are being
effective at achieving program goals. Straightforward but valuable information about the
activities of the AMWG are simply not compiled. How often are AMWG recommendations
based on a consensus? On a super-majority vote? How often are AMWG recommendations
adopted by the Secretary? This and more information would undoubtedly be useful in
assessing the effectiveness of the AMP’s regulatory framework in achieving meaningful
participation and resource management, and even perhaps reinforcing the accountability of
the regulatory actors to Congress and the public.”).
262. DOWNSTREAM, supra note 74, at 59–61.
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ability to assess and improve the AMP as the program matures.
CONCLUSION
Despite the best of intentions and the availability of considerable
resources, the Glen Canyon Dam AMP has failed to bring
stakeholders together to jointly increase their understanding of the
Colorado River and make useful, broadly supported resource
management recommendations. The management of the Dam has
not reflected an informed consensus on either scientific or nontechnical questions, and has left the humpback chub and other
species and habitats at risk. The AMP has not evolved into an
increasingly competent joint management body; rather, it still plays
an uncertain advisory role to the Secretary of the Interior.
Fundamentally, the failure of the AMP stems from questionable
decisions by Congress and the Secretary of Interior regarding the
AMP’s design and operation.
A better CAM process requires government authorities to adopt
clear enabling authority that establishes the goals of the program
and makes stakeholders responsible for progressing toward these
objectives. Had Congress and the DOI focused on developing a
successful dispute resolution process, the AMP would have been
better positioned to:
1) Identify the various interest groups that should be involved and
263
their interests;
2) Ensure that the relevant federal and state agencies understand
and respect the interests of the non-governmental stakeholders
involved;
3) Understand and clarify the priorities that ought to be attached to
the competing national interests at stake in the management of
the Colorado River, the Dam, and the surrounding area and
determine how to reconcile these interests; and
4) Encourage joint fact finding and, based on the findings of its
scientific advisory groups, agree on a set of adaptive management
experiments that would help the AMP gain better information,
manage uncertainty, and learn over time how to improve at
resource management.

The Glen Canyon Dam AMP shows that a stated commitment to
collaboration and adaptive management is insufficient. Effective
joint management of natural resources can only be realized
263. Susskind & Thomas-Larmer, supra note 145.
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through careful attention to the design and implementation of
appropriate
problem-solving
and
adaptive-management
procedures. It also requires the development of an appropriate
organizational infrastructure that promotes stakeholder dialogue
and agency learning. Though the experimental Glen Canyon Dam
AMP is far from a success of collaborative adaptive management,
the lessons from its shortcomings can foster more effective CAM in
the future by Congress, federal agencies, and local and state
authorities. Should legislators and regulators learn to build more
robust collaborative and adaptive institutions from the Glen
Canyon Dam experience, the legacy of the Glen Canyon Dam AMP,
which has been underwhelming thus far, might be well worth the
wait.
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